The Granularity Effects:  Numerical Judgment from a Social Perspective. by Zhang, Yizi
 
 
THE GRANULARITY EFFECTS:  






A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
Of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Business Administration) 










 Professor Norbert W. Schwarz, Chair 
 Associate Professor Stephen M. Garcia 
 Professor Aradhna J. Krishna  




Table of Contents 
 
List of Figures iii 
List of Appendices iv 
Abstract v 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Different Perspectives on Numerical Perception 2 
The Cognitive and Social Basis of Inference from Quantities 5 
Chapter 2: Inferences from the Granularity of Quantitative Expressions 10 
Background 11 
Study 1: Estimates of Precision 18 
Studies 2 and 3: the role of Communicator Cooperativeness 20 
Study 4: Impact on Choice 27 
General Discussion 30 
Chapter 3: The Power of Precise Numbers 37 
Numerical cognition and the logic of conversation 37 
Implications for judgment 38 
Study 1 39 
Study 2 41 
General Discussion 44 
Chapter 4: Cross-dimensional Consumer Inference from Quantitative Expressions 46 
Background 47 
Study 1 52 
Study 2 53 
Study 3 56 
Study 4 59 
General Discussion 61 













Figure 1: Results of Study 1, Chapter 2          68 
Figure 1: Results of Study 2, Chapter 2          69 





Figure 1: Results of Study 2, Chapter 4          71 
Figure 1: Results of Study 3, Chapter 4          72 




List of Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Sample image for the chocolate (9.7 oz.) in study 2, chapter 4  74 






In marketplace, information is communicated to consumers by marketers. 
Accordingly, judgments and decisions made in response to this information ought to be 
considered in their communicative context. Research in quantitative judgment typically 
fails to do so; it analyzes judgment and decision making in a social vacuum, essentially 
pretending that the quantitative information simply exists and comes from nowhere. In 
contrast, my research places quantitative judgment in its conversational context by 
investigating how people make inferences from the expression of a quantity. The 
theoretical basis of this research is built on Grice’s (1975) logic of conversation, which 
suggests that information recipients interpret a piece of communication based on the 
assumption that the speaker provides as much information as is relevant while 
remaining truthful. A series of three essays addresses this issue.  
In the first essay, I study how consumers draw inferences from a time estimate 
expressed at different levels of granularity. Consumers consider estimates expressed in 
finer granularity more precise and have more confidence in their accuracy. Hence, they 
perceive products as more likely to deliver on their promises when the promise is 
described in fine grained rather than coarse units. In the second essay, I find that precise 
numbers have a stronger influence on subsequent estimates than round numbers, in the 
way that people make small adjustment from the anchor when the anchor is a precise 
(vs. round) number. In the third essay, I argue that pragmatic inference is situated in the 
judgment task, so that the influence of numerical expression can go beyond quantitative 
judgment. In judgments of product value, precise statements of volume on a package 
give rise to the inference that the product is particularly valuable. Importantly, all these 
effects are eliminated when consumers doubt that the communicator complies with 
Gricean norms of cooperative conversational conduct. My dissertation concludes that 
there is more to “numeric cognition” than mere numbers – the numbers are 
communicated and we cannot fully understand their influence without taking 
communicative processes into account. It highlights the role of pragmatic inferences in 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Numbers are part of us. They are the basic element for measuring any magnitudes, 
and plays a crucial role in many aspects of consumers’ everyday life, from price to 
product specifications, and from purchase planning to consumer budgeting.  
 
How numbers are represented in our mind and how we use them are central to our 
curiosity about numbers. Scholarly pursuit of these questions has never stopped since 
the sixteenth century (Bernoulli 1738/1954). It has long been a tradition that these 
questions were approached from a cognitive and psychophysical perspective, as 
numerical input has been considered largely analogous to physical stimuli (Algom et al. 
1996; Grewal and Marmorstein 1994; Dehaene, Dupoux, and Mehler 1990). 
Nevertheless, recent research suggests that the scope of how we think about numbers 
could be far broader: numerical perception is not only determined by the cognitive 
representations based on which the numbers are processed, but is also affected by the 
feelings elicited from processing them (Thomas and Morwtiz 2009). Moreover, 
numbers in different presentations (e.g. round vs. sharp numbers) do not only differ in 
their perceived magnitudes, but could also trigger different levels of motivation (Pope 
and Simonsohn 2011).  
 
In this dissertation, I introduce a new prospective to investigate how people think 
about numbers. Building on the theory of cooperative communication (Grice 1975), I 
study how numerical information presented in different forms conveys information 
about the communicator’s knowledge and motives, which potentially affects the 
judgment of the target on which the numbers bear.  
 
The first chapter of this dissertation is organized as follows. I will first briefly 
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review the literature on numerical perception from cognitive, psychophysical, affective, 
and motivational perspectives. Then, I will discuss the cognitive and the social basis 
that renders inferences from numerical presentations possible, and then briefly 
overview the chapters of this dissertation.  
 
Different Perspectives on Numerical Perception 
Numerical Perception from a Cognitive Perspective 
 
Numbers are believed to be processed in dedicated cognitive subsystems (Ashcraft 
1992; Dehaene 1992; McClosky and Macaruso 1995). In agreement with the notion of 
grounded cognition (Barsalou 2008), evidence has shown that these subsystems are 
grounded in different modal simulations, which give rise to different representations 
for numbers. 
 
One of the representations places numbers on a mental number line, with small 
numbers resting on the left and large numbers on the right, referred to as the Spatial-
Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC). Supporting this theory, research 
has shown that people respond faster to small numbers using their left hands, and to 
large numbers using their right hands, but slower the other way around. This effect 
holds no matter when the focal task requires judging the magnitude of the numbers or 
not (Dehaene et al. 1990; Dehaene, Bossini, and Giraux 1993). It has also been shown 
that SNARC is bi-directional, and has downstream effects in attention and judgment. 
For example, attention can be shifted to the left (vs. right) by small (vs. large) numbers 
(Fischer et al. 2003); numerical estimation can be biased by the spatial movement of 
either the perceiver (Eerland, Guadalupe, and Zwaan 2011) or the target (Cai, Shen, and 
Hui 2012). The spatial representation of numbers further predicts that the larger the 
difference between the magnitudes of the numbers, the larger the mental distance 
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between the numbers on the number line. Thus, people are faster distinguishing 
between numbers with greater difference than that between numbers with smaller 
difference (Duncan and McFarland 1980; Moyer and Landauer 1967).  
 
Numbers have also been shown to be processed based on other representations. 
Numbers large in magnitude are associated with large physical sizes, as physical size 
and numerical magnitude overlap in the brain (Pinel et al. 2004). As a result, when 
printed in large fonts, number “9”, as opposed to number “1”, is faster to be identified 
than when printed in small fonts (Henik and Tzelgov 1982); numbers printed in large 
fonts are also judged to have a larger magnitude (Coulter and Coulter 2005). In addition 
to the number line and physical size, some other representations of numbers involve 
solving arithmetic problems of addition and subtraction (e.g Roman numerals; Noel 
and Seron 1997), or visual-motor movements (e.g. beads arrangements on an abacus; 
Stigler 1984). Finally, for some people, the representation of numbers is also grounded 
in the sensory experience of colors, such that small numbers are associated with light 
colors and large numbers are associated with darker colors (Seron et al. 1992).  
 
The cognitive perspective of numerical processing suggests that, when processing 
numerical inputs, individuals convert the input into one of these representations in an 
automatic and unconscious manner; which specific representation they take depends on 
the nature of the judgment task and the decision context.  
 
Numerical Perception from a Psychophysical Perspective 
 
Numerical input has been considered largely analogous to physical stimuli (Algom 
et al. 1996; Grewal and Marmorstein 1994; Dehaene et al. 1990). The comparison of 
numerical magnitudes typically displays a pattern that follows the Weber-Fechner Law. 
Specifically, the perceived difference between two numbers is proportional to the 
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magnitude of the numbers being compared. In line with this proposition, research has 
shown that, with the same absolute difference, the subjective difference between small 
numbers (e.g. 5 vs. 10) is perceived as greater than the subjective difference between 
large numbers (e.g. 155 vs. 160; Banks and Coleman 1981; Shepard, Kilpatrick, and 
Cunningham 1975). This evidence suggests that the perceived numerical distance is a 
joint function of both the absolute difference and the relative difference between the 
two numbers, or, more precisely, follows a log-Gaussian model (Dehaene 2007).  
 
Numerical Perception from an Affective Perspective 
 
 The processing of numbers is not entirely based on the cognitive subsystems; 
people sometimes use heuristics and/or their feelings to form numerical perceptions as 
well. One of the consequences is that the perceived difference between two numbers 
does not necessary reflect the actual difference between the numbers (or the log of 
numbers, per the psychophysical view). For instance, it has been widely observed in 
the pricing literature that prices ending with .99 are more attractive to consumers 
(Schindler and Kirby 1997). Thomas and Morwitz (2005) explain this effect by showing 
that consumers adopt a heuristic to from numerical judgment, namely, the magnitude 
of a number is largely determined by its left-most digit, so that the difference between 
2.99 and 3 is perceived as larger than that between 2.98 and 2.99. In other research, the 
same authors identify that ease of computation also plays an important role in judging 
numerical differences (Thomas and Morwitz 2009). Specifically, the difference 
between two numbers is judged to be greater when it feels easier to compute (e.g. 5 - 4) 
than when it feels difficult to compute (e.g. 4.97 - 3.89). However, when experiment 
participants were forewarned that the following computation would be difficult, the 
difficulty in computation did not influence the subjective judgment of the numerical 
differences, presumably because the 4.97 - 3.89 did not feel as difficult as the 
participants had expected (Thomas and Morwitz 2009). This line of research suggests 
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that judgment of numerical information does not only rely on the cognitive 
representation of numbers, but is also influenced by the affective system. 
 
Numerical Perception from a Motivational Perspective 
 
Rosch (1975) suggests that round numbers serve as cognitive reference points for 
the sharp numbers close to it. For example, most people agree that “102 is essentially 
100”, but not the other way around. Building on this notion, Pope and Simonsohn (2011) 
demonstrated that a round number is, by default, regarded as a goal; it motivates 
individuals whose current measure of performance is just below the round number to 
improve their performance, even though the round number is not explicitly set as a goal 
or attached to a direct consequence. For example, they find that professional batters are 
more likely to reach a batting average of .300 than .299, and high school students are 
more likely to retake SAT when their total score ends with “90” (e.g. 1190) than when 
their total score ends with “00” (e.g. 1200). This research suggests that round numbers 
differ from their close sharp numbers not only quantitatively (e.g. in their perceived 
magnitudes), but also qualitatively (e.g. in people’s motivation to achieve it).  
 
The Cognitive and Social Basis of Inference from Quantities 
Our brain pays more attention to the target when the target concerns small or round 
numbers, presumably because of our limited capacity of short-term memory (Dehaene 
2011, p.100, 103). As a result, for the purpose of communication, encoding, or 
processing quantitative information, people prefer to present quantities in round 
numbers as long as the difference between the actual quantity (e.g. 96) and the rounded 
quantity (e.g. 100) is perceived small enough to be ignored in the given context. 
Similarly, people also prefer to present quantities in coarse units (which come with 
smaller numbers) when the difference between the actual quantity (e.g. 110 minutes) 
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and the converted quantity (e.g. 2 hours) is small enough to be ignored in the given 
context. 
 
Given this idea, consider the following example in rounding. On the one hand, 
processing the round number 100 may require less cognitive resource than processing 
the sharp number 96. On the other hand, rounding 96 up to 100 will be at the price of 
precision. Therefore, using “100” to present an actual number of 96 will only occur in 
judgment contexts where the cost of ignoring the deviation of 4 is smaller or compatible 
to the benefit of rounding (e.g. saving cognitive resource). However, 96 will never be 
“rounded” to another sharp number, say 98, because although the perceived difference 
between 96 and 98 is even smaller than that between 96 and 100 (which means even 
smaller cost of “rounding”), there is no cognitive benefit to use “98” to present an actual 
quantity of 96. Or, using Rosch (1975)’s term, 98 is not a cognitive reference point for 
96. Therefore, when a sharp number (e.g. “98”) is presented, the actual quantity could 
deviate from the presented quantity to a smaller extent than when a round number (e.g. 
“100”) is presented. In other words, sharp numbers are more precise.  
 
A similar but slightly different logic applies to quantities expressed with units. The 
expression “1 kilogram” may present any quantities that are reasonably close to 1 
kilogram, for example, 1.2 kilograms. And so does the expression “1,000 grams”. 
However, since processing a larger number (e.g. 1,000) needs more cognitive recourse 
than processing a smaller number (e.g. 1), presenting a weight as “1,000 grams” instead 
of “1 kilogram” only makes sense when the expression of “1,000 grams” is more 
informative than “1 kilogram”, which means less uncertainty, or smaller potential range 
of the quantities it may potentially represent. Therefore, when a quantity is expressed 
in a fine-grained unit, the actual quantity could deviate from the presented quantity to 
a smaller extent than when the same quantity is expressed in a coarse unit. In other 




However, there is an important presumption for the conclusions I made in the last 
two paragraphs, namely, a choice among different granularities of expressions is 
available. When a certain presentation in which a quantity is expressed is mandatory 
(e.g. in a system that 98 can never be rounded to 100), the presentation is no longer 
informative (e.g. “98” is no more precise than “100”). In other words, those conclusions 
could only be drawn in the context of numerical communication, where the 
communicator (usually) gets a choice of the numerical expression (i.e. rounding the 
number or not, converting to coarse units or not), and the recipients draw inference 
from the presentation they receive. For example, since less precise expressions may 
suggest a relatively large deviation from actual quantity, communicators often use them 
to describe the fact that they know that the actual quantity is, or may be, quite different 
from the presented quantity. Therefore, recipients who encounter such expressions will 
perceive uncertainty and less information from this communication.  
 
In fact, the inference that information recipients could draw from the 
communicator’s intent behind their quantitative expression is consistent with the norms 
of cooperative communication (Grice 1975). The norms of cooperative communication 
require that communicators’ utterance should be truthful and, at the same time, relevant 
to the purpose of the communication. Thus, an expression low in the informational 
value (i.e. a less precise expression) could only suggest one of two things – either that 
the communicator does not know more and thus is not able to be more informative, or 
that any extra precision is irrelevant to the purpose of communication. Likewise, when 
an expression high in the informational value is used (i.e. a more precise expression), 
the recipients could infer that the communicator has sufficient knowledge and 
confidence about what s/he is talking about, and that the information communicated by 
the chosen precision is somehow relevant to the judgment task. Which of these two 
inferences will be made and how they will reflect on the judgment target depends on 
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the specific context of judgment, which will be further investigated in the rest of this 
dissertation.  
 
Specifically, in chapters 2 and 3, I demonstrate that quantitative judgment can be 
affected by the expression in which the informational cues are presented. Specifically, 
in chapter 2, I show that information recipients believe that the communicator has more 
knowledge about and higher confidence in the estimate expressed in fine grained (vs. 
coarse) units, because the communicator should not have provided an expression with 
high informational value if s/he does not know that the potential deviation must be small 
or if s/he does not intent to convey extra information. This communicated certainty 
should result in higher confidence among recipients, reflected in narrower confidence 
intervals for about when an event will happen (e.g. repairing a car, developing a new 
product, life of a battery, etc.). In a similar vein, in chapter 3, I investigate how sharp 
vs. round numbers affect quantitative judgment when they serve as a numerical anchor. 
From the perspective of communication, I reinterpret findings that a sharp anchor leads 
to a stronger anchoring effect, which was initially demonstrated by Janiszewski and Uy 
(2008). While these authors suggest that sharp anchors create a fine grained mental 
representation of numbers, I show that people actually infer that presenting the anchor 
as a sharp number is necessary for the judgment task. Since sharp numbers suggest 
smaller deviation, people will conclude that the answer to the judgment task is close to 
the anchor, because otherwise a round anchor, which is easier to process, will do the 
job.  
 
In chapter 4, I go beyond quantitative judgment and extend my investigation to 
cross-domain judgment. I show that consumers judge a product to have higher value if 
the product weight is expressed in a sharp (e.g. 9.7 oz.) rather than a round number (e.g. 
10 oz.). Expressing the product weight in a sharp (vs. round) number conveys that the 
marketer guarantees that the actual weight of the product would not deviate much from 
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the expressed (sharp) weight. A reasonable interpretation behind marketer’s intolerance 
against the potential variation of the weight is that the unit value of the product is high, 
such that small deviations in weight could lead to substantial differences in the total 
value of the product. Thus, when consumers make judgment about the product value, 
they infer high product value of from the sharp weight, and relatively low value from 
the round weight.  
 
Across these three chapters, I also show that the effects are eliminated in cases 
where the conversational norms are violated, for example, when the communicator is 
non-human, when the communicator is considered not cooperative, or when there is no 
reason to assume that the potential inference from granularity would apply. The 
elimination of the effects provides strong evidence that the effect is caused by recipients’ 





Chapter 2: Inferences from the Granularity of 
Quantitative Expressions 
 
While talking with friends, you learn that your former boss has been sentenced for 
fraud. One of your friends thinks your boss received a jail term of “one year” and 
another friend reports that it is “366 days”. Who seems more knowledgeable about the 
details of the case? Similarly, suppose you want to order a custom made good. You ask 
the service representative how long your order would take if you placed it today. Would 
it make a difference if the representative answered, “one month”, “four weeks” or “30 
days”? In both examples, the respective expressions refer to the same extension of time 
and are often used interchangeably. Nevertheless, recipients may perceive the speakers’ 
reports as differentially precise and reliable. The present research addresses this 
possibility and explores its consequences for marketing communications and consumer 
decision making. 
 We first place the issue in the context of Grice’s (1975) logic of conversation, which 
provides a conceptual framework for understanding how recipients arrive at different 
inferences from substantively equivalent speaker utterances. Next, we test three key 
predictions. First, we predict, and observe, that the granularity of the communicator’s 
quantitative utterance affects recipients’ confidence in the accuracy of the information. 
For example, study 1b asks consumers to place a time window around the completion 
date of a project by indicating the earliest and latest date at which they think the project 
may actually get done. This window, which resembles a confidence interval, shrinks 
with the granularity of the quantitative expression – thus, a completion time expressed 
as “one year” comes with a time window of 140 days, but this window shrinks to 84 
days when the same time period is expressed as “52 weeks”. This effect presumably 
reflects that recipients draw pragmatic inferences from the form of a communicator’s 
utterance, consistent with the Gricean logic of conversation. If so, second, granularity 
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should only influence consumers’ inferences under conditions in which they can assume 
that the communicator is cooperative, that is, follows Gricean norms of conversational 
conduct (Schwarz 1996). Empirically, this is the case. When the communicator’s 
cooperativeness is called into question because the communicator either lacks relevant 
knowledge (study 2) or general trustworthiness (study 3), the otherwise observed 
effects are eliminated. This observation is incompatible with alternative interpretations 
of the influence of numeric expressions on consumer judgment, as discussed later. 
Consistent with their pragmatic inferences, consumers perceive products as more likely 
to deliver on their promises when the promise is described in fine grained rather than 
coarse terms, and choose accordingly (study 4). In combination, these studies contribute 
to our understanding of biases in quantitative judgment by drawing attention to the role 
of conversational inference processes. They highlight that substantively equivalent 
quantitative utterances can give rise to differential inferences depending on the 





In everyday life, consumers encounter many quantitative expressions. Even when 
the values are precise and well-defined, consumers’ understanding of quantitative 
expressions often deviates from their objective meaning. Previous research identified a 
number of cognitive heuristics that contribute to these biases (for a review, see Thomas 
and Morwitz 2009). As observed in other domains of judgment, however, biases are not 
solely a function of individuals’ thoughts about the respective content domain or of the 
accessibility of applicable procedures. Instead, they often arise from tacit assumptions 
underlying the conduct of conversation, which license pragmatic inferences that go 
beyond the literal meaning of a speaker’s utterance (for reviews, see Hilton 1995; 
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Schwarz 1994, 1996).  
 
Logic of Conversation 
 
These pragmatic inferences can be conceptualized in the context of Grice’s (1975, 
1978) logic of conversation. Grice, a philosopher of language, suggested conversations 
proceed according to a cooperativeness principle that is comprised of four maxims. 
First, a maxim or relation requires speakers to provide only information that is relevant 
to the aims of the ongoing conversation; hence, speakers’ contributions come with a 
“guarantee of relevance” (Sperber and Wilson 1986), unless marked otherwise. Second, 
a maxim of manner encourages speakers to do their best to be understood by the 
recipient; this implies that utterances should not be more complex than needed for the 
task at hand. Third, a maxim of quantity asks speakers to provide as much information 
as the recipient needs, but not more and not less. Finally, a maxim of quality urges 
speakers to only say things they know to be true and accurate. All four maxims bear on 
how speakers should communicate quantitative information. Specifically, speakers 
should only provide truthful information (maxim of quality) that is relevant to the 
purpose of the conversation (maxim of relation) and they should do so in a manner that 
is easy to understand (maxim of manner) by providing the relevant level of detail, but 
neither more nor less detail than needed (maxim of quantity). Observance of these 
maxims is considered cooperative conversational conduct and most forms of 
uncooperative conduct involve violations of more than one maxim.  
 Violations of these maxims are common in everyday conversations, as Grice 
(1975) acknowledged. Nevertheless, a large body of linguistic and behavioral research 
(for reviews, see Clark 1985; Clark and Schober 1992; Levinson 1983; McCann and 
Higgins 1992; Schwarz 1996; Strack and Schwarz 1992) shows that recipients interpret 
speakers' utterances "on the assumption that they are trying to live up to these ideals" 
(Clark and Clark 1977, 122). Even when recipients doubt that the speaker is cooperative, 
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they first need to comprehend what the speaker intended them to infer before they can 
make meaningful corrections for the suspected intention to mislead (Gilbert 1991; 
Schwarz 1996), unless the statement pertains to highly accessible and specific knowledge 
of the recipient (Richter, Schroeder, and Britta 2009). Accordingly, Grice’s tacit 
assumptions of cooperative communication govern the conduct of conversation in daily 
life and guide speaker’s design of their own messages as well as listeners’ inferences from 
these messages (Grice 1975; Levinson 1983).  
The implications of Grice’s (1975) logic of conversation extend beyond prototypical 
“conversations”. Although Grice’s initial analyses focused on personal conversations, 
later work showed that the maxims of cooperative conversational conduct guide pragmatic 
inferences in all communicative contexts (for a discussion, see Levinson 1983). In fact, 
their impact on recipients’ interpretation of a speaker’s utterance is particularly 
pronounced when no personal “speaker” is present. This is the case because presence of 
the speaker allows for queries and enables the collaborative negotiation of meaning when 
an utterance remains ambiguous (Clark and Schober 1982). Such opportunities are 
missing when the speaker is absent, which forces recipients to draw on general principles 
of conversational conduct and language use to infer what the communicator may have 
intended to convey. Accordingly, Gricean inference effects are particularly pronounced in 
settings that preclude the mutual negotiation of meaning as has been observed in 
standardized research settings, where experimenters and interviewers are often 
discouraged from providing explanations and where self-administered questionnaires are 
presented in the absence of any person who could be asked for clarifications (Schwarz 
1995, 1996; Strack and Schwarz 1992). The same communicative constraint applies to 
most marketing communications, from product descriptions and reviews to company 
announcements and advertisements (Xu and Wyer 2010); throughout, they lack 
opportunities for consumer queries and hence encourage pragmatic inferences based on 
message and context characteristics. We acknowledge the impersonal nature of these 
“conversations” by referring to the participants as communicators and recipients, rather 
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The above reasoning implies that Gricean considerations will affect 
communicators’ choice of the granularity in which they express quantitative 
information as well as recipients’ inferences from this choice. In general, quantitative 
communications provide more information when the quantity is expressed in fine 
grained rather than coarse forms. This is most apparent when the information is 
communicated in form of an interval, for example, when a price estimate is expressed 
as “$5,000 to $6,000” or “$1,000 to $10,000”. Here, the choice of interval width 
conveys the communicator’s confidence in the accuracy of the estimate. Not 
surprisingly, recipients prefer narrow intervals, which provide more information. 
Moreover, they are willing to sacrifice formal accuracy for informational value. For 
example, when the true value is $22.5 billion, 80% of participants prefer the estimate 
“$18 to 20 billion” over the estimate “$20 to 40 billion”, even though the latter interval 
includes the correct value whereas the former does not (Yaniv and Foster 1995).  
Whereas interval estimates convey the intended level of precision through the 
width of the interval, explicit precision information is missing when the communicator 
offers only one quantitative value, thus providing a point estimate. Nevertheless, 
recipients are aware that estimates come with a certain degree of uncertainty. Hence, 
you would not consider it misleading if a friend who is driving from another city said 
“I’ll be there in two hours”, even though she is aware that it may take her as little as 
one and a half hours or as much as two and a half hours to arrive. On the other hand, 
you might wonder what has happened to her if she told you in the same circumstance 
that she’ll arrive “in 115 minutes”, but has not yet shown up 30 minutes later. As this 
example illustrates, point estimates come with an implied interval and the size of this 
interval varies with the level of granularity in which the estimate is expressed. 
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Accordingly, cooperative communicators should satisfy the Gricean requests for 
simplicity, informativeness, and truthfulness by using a level of granularity that takes 
their own knowledge into account, conveying neither more nor less information than 
they can warrant. 
We assume that recipients are sensitive to communicators’ choice of granularity 
and take it into account when they interpret communicators’ utterances. Hence, we 
predict (i) that recipients perceive the same quantitative estimate as more precise when 
it is expressed in fine grained rather than coarse units, resulting (ii) in narrower interval 
estimates (study 1). These effects should not be observed when recipients doubt that 
the speaker is a cooperative communicator. While many variables can undermine 
recipients’ perceptions of a communicator’s cooperativeness (Levinson 1983; Schwarz 
1996), some are particularly relevant in the present context. The most germane variable 
is the perceived likelihood that the communicator’s factual knowledge warrants the 
precision entailed in his or her utterance – does the communicator really know what he 
or she is talking about? A second relevant variable is the communicator’s perceived 
general credibility – is there reason to believe that the communicator may be 
deliberately misleading? In either case, the assumptions of cooperative conversational 
conduct do not apply and recipients should hesitate to draw pragmatic inferences from 
the format of the utterance. This predicts, (iii) that the otherwise obtained granularity 
effects will not be observed when recipients suspect that the implied precision of the 
communicator’s utterance exceeds the required knowledge (study 2) or that the 
communicator may not be trustworthy (study 3). Finally, consumers’ pragmatic 
inferences are likely to have behavioral consequences. If the same estimate is perceived 
as more precise when conveyed in fine grained units, consumers should (iv) be more 
confident that a product delivers what it promises when the quantitative promise is 
expressed in fine rather than coarse units, affecting their product choice (study 4). 
While we assume that these granularity predictions hold for all expressions of 
quantity, the present studies test them in the domain of time estimates. Consumers’ 
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perceptions of time are an important element in many aspects of consumer behavior, 
from planning (Leclerc, Schmitt, and Dubé 1995; Ülkümen, Thomas, and Morwitz 
2008) and waiting (Kumar, Kalwani, and Dada 1997) to service and product evaluation 




Before we present our studies, it is worth highlighting how they differ from 
previous work that explored how the format of quantity expressions affects consumers’ 
perceptions. Previous work showed that people judge the magnitude of a quantitative 
expression by focusing on foreground information (i.e., the number or the numerator) 
at the expense of background information (i.e., the unit or the denominator; Stone et al. 
2003). For example, spending $1 per day is perceived as a better deal than spending 
$365 per year (Gourville 1998) and a gamble with a chance of 9 out of 100 is preferred 
to a gamble with a chance of 1 out of 10 (Pacini and Epstein 1999). Moreover, 
consumers judge prices in an unfamiliar foreign currency on the basis of their numeric 
face value and infer, for example, that a price of 1,100 Korean wons is higher than a 
price of a 110 Japanese yen, despite their equivalence in U.S. dollars (Raghubir and 
Srivastava 2002). Similarly, people attend insufficiently to the format of a rating scale 
when judging the difference between two ratings and give a difference of 20 on a 100-
point scale more weight than a difference of 2 on a 10-point scale (Burson, Larrick, and 
Lynch 2009). The latter effect is not limited to rating scales of differential length but 
also observed when two quantities are expressed in fine grained rather than coarse units 
(Pandelaere, Briers, and Lembregts 2011). For example, when choosing between two 
dish washers, a long warranty receives more weight when a fine grained unit results in 
a large numerical difference between the two warranties (e.g., 84 vs. 108 months) than 
when a coarse unit results in a smaller numerical difference (e.g., 7 vs. 9 years; 
Pandelaere et al. 2011). These and related studies share an interest in how numeric 
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values influence quantity estimates; they consistently find that higher values elicit 
perceptions of larger quantity with downstream consequences on judgment and choice. 
Different accounts have been offered for such numerosity effects, including anchoring 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974), magnitude priming (Oppenheimer, LeBoef, and 
Brewer 2008), and the operation of a numerosity heuristic (Pelham, Sumarta, and 
Myaskovsky 1994; see Thomas and Morwitz 2009 and Pandelaere et al. 2011 for 
reviews).   
In contrast, the present research emphasizes that the use of fine grained units does 
not merely result in higher numerical expressions, which can affect quantity estimation 
through several different pathways. Instead, the present research highlights that 
messages with fine grained units also convey a higher level of precision because 
cooperative communicators (Grice 1975) are not assumed to present information in a 
manner that is more precise than their knowledge warrants. Hence, consumers infer that 
the real value is closer to the communicated value when it is conveyed in fine grained 
rather than coarse units, unless they have reason to assume that the communicator may 
not be cooperative. This can result in circumstances where “higher numbers” (that is, 
more fine grained expressions) result in lower rather than higher estimates, as our 
studies will illustrate (studies 1-3). Such reversals are incompatible with number-
focused accounts that predict numerosity effects in form of higher estimates in the 
context of higher numbers, as discussed above. Moreover, the reversals are only 
expected, and observed, under conditions where the communicator can be assumed to 
be cooperative (studies 2 and 3). In combination, these findings highlight that human 
judgment in a social context is a function of cognitive and communicative processes 
(Schwarz 1996; Sperber and Wilson 1986) and that thinking about quantities involves 




Study 1: Estimates of Precision 
 
 Study 1 tested the basic hypothesis: the same time expression is perceived as more 
precise when expressed in fine grained rather than coarse units. We measured the 
perceived precision of the estimate by asking participants to report their best and worst 
case estimates for the completion of a project, given the speaker’s claim. In study 1a, 
participants provided these estimates in an open response format; in study 1b they 
marked the best and worst completion date on a calendar. On both measures, assumed 
low (high) precision results in a wide (narrow) time window around the speaker’s claim, 




Study 1a. Two hundred and sixty-seven people were approached on the campus of 
the University of Michigan and asked to imagine that their car needed complicated 
repairs. Depending on conditions, the dealership estimated that obtaining the relevant 
parts and repairing the car would take “30 days”, “31 days”, or “1 month”. Participants 
were asked for their best and worst case estimates – that is the minimum and maximum 
number of days they might have to wait. 
 
Study 1b. Ninety students taking an undergraduate marketing class read an 
announcement about a construction project. Depending on conditions, the expected 
duration of the construction project was described as “1 year”, “12 month”, or “52 
weeks”. Next, participants were handed a calendar with the start date and the estimated 
end date of the project marked. They were asked to circle on the calendar the earliest 
and latest likely completion date, that is, their best case and worst case completion 




Results and Discussion 
 
In both studies, the unit in which the communicator expressed an otherwise 
identical estimate influenced participants’ own time estimates: the more fine grained 
the unit, the narrower the recipient’s time window (i.e., confidence interval) around the 
communicator’s estimate.  
------------------------------ 
Insert figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
As shown in the top panel of figure 1, participants who were asked to provide best 
and worst case estimates of how long they would have to wait for their car (study 1a) 
indicated confidence intervals of 20.6 and 20.3 days around the speaker’s estimate of 
30 and 31 days, respectively. These two conditions did not differ from one another (t < 
1), but were significantly smaller than the confidence interval of 24.8 days when the 
communicator’s estimate was expressed as “1 month” (t(266) = 2.42, p < .05); this also 
holds for the underlying individual comparisons (t(266) = 2.10 for the contrast between 
1 month and 30 days, and t(266) = 2.27 for the contrast between 1 month and 31 days, 
p’s < .05). Note also that each interval is composed of two component estimates (figure 
1), one pertaining to how many days delivery may be ahead of schedule and one to how 
many days delivery may be behind schedule. Each of these component estimates was 
smaller when the communication provided high (30 or 31 days) rather than low (1 
month) numbers, in contrast to the prediction of numerosity models.  
Study1b replicated this pattern with three levels of granularity (1 year, 12 months, 
52 weeks) and a response format that did not require explicit numerical estimates of 
wait time. As shown in the bottom panel of figure 1, participants who were asked to 
check the earliest and latest plausible completion dates of a construction project on a 
calendar indicated confidence intervals of 140 days in the “one year”, 105 days in the 
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“12 months”, and 84 days in the “52 weeks” condition; thus, the more fine-grained the 
unit, the smaller the confidence interval (β = 27.8, t(88) = 3.24, p < .005).  
 In both studies, recipients went beyond the literal meaning of the communicators’ 
utterances and attended to their choice of granularity in interpreting the meaning of time 
estimates. As predicted by Grice’s (1975) logic of conversation, they inferred higher 
precision of the estimate when the communicator expressed it in more fine grained units. 
Note also that recipients’ estimates reflected the common knowledge that projects of 
any type are more likely to be completed late rather than early (Kahneman and Lovallo 
1993): independent of unit, their worst-case estimates deviated more from the 
communicators’ predictions than their best-case estimates. This observation implies 
that the use of coarse time units in marketing communications suggests more potential 
downside than potential upside to consumers: although coarse granularity in principle 
allows for earlier as well as later delivery dates, the likelihood of long delays will loom 
much larger.  
Finally, it is worth noting that participants’ estimates involved “larger numbers” 
when the communicator’s message presented “small” (coarse granularity) rather than 
“large” (fine granularity) numbers, in contrast to what numerosity models would predict. 
 
Studies 2 and 3: the role of Communicator Cooperativeness 
 
The observed effects of granularity are consistent with Grice’s (1975) logic of 
conversation, which licenses inferences that go beyond the literal meaning of a 
communicator’s utterance. These inferences are based on the tacit assumption that the 
communicator is cooperative and presents information in a form that satisfies the 
maxims of conversational conduct. Once this assumption is called into question, 
recipients no longer rely on the form of the communicator’s utterances to interpret their 
meaning (Dodd and Bradshaw 1980; Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, and Naderer 1991; Smith 
21 
 
and Ellsworth 1987; for a review, see Schwarz 1996). Given that consumers are aware 
that companies have an incentive to influence them (Friestad and Wright 1994), one 
may wonder, however, whether they apply the cooperativeness assumption to 
marketing communications. The empirical answer is that they do, as the success of 
many misleading marketing communications illustrates (Boush, Friestad and Wright 
2009). This is not surprising because acceptance of the cooperativeness assumptions is 
the default that underlies all communication in daily life – and even when we suspect 
misleading intentions we need to apply Gricean inferences to determine what the 
communicator wants us to conclude, before we can correct for it (Gilbert 1991; Schwarz 
1996), unless the communicated message directly contradicts specific and highly 
accessible knowledge of the recipient (Richter et al. 2009). While many variables can 
undermine recipients’ perceptions of a communicator’s cooperativeness (Levinson 
1983; Xu and Wyer 2010), two are particularly relevant in a marketing context, namely 
the communicator’s likely topic-specific knowledge (study 2) and general 
trustworthiness (study 3).  
 
Study 2: Communicator’s Expertise  
 
As seen in study 1, recipients assume that quantitative statements are more precise 
when they are expressed in fine grained rather than coarse units. The resulting 
estimation effects should be attenuated or eliminated when recipients suspect that the 
precision implied by the format of the communicator’s message may exceed the 
communicator’s actual knowledge. To test this prediction, study 2 attributed the 
message to a communicator who is vs. is not likely to have the relevant factual 
knowledge. 
 
Method. One hundred and twenty-eight participants were recruited from an online 
subject pool and received a cash reward of 10 cents. The study followed a 2 (relevant 
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knowledge: given vs. questionable) X 2 (granularity: fine vs. coarse) between-subjects 
design. Participants read in an alleged news article that the world's largest car 
manufacturer is developing a new type of car based on cutting edge technology. The 
article reported that the new car would be released either in 2 years (coarse unit) or in 
104 weeks (fine unit). To manipulate the communicator’s perceived knowledge, half of 
the participants were told that the article was based on an announcement made by “the 
chief research officer of the company, who is well known in the industry for his strong 
project planning ability”; the other half was told that the news article was based on “a 
rumor spread by an auto fan website”.  
Subsequently, all participants were asked how likely it is that “the new car would 
be successfully launched to market as planned” (1= “extremely unlikely”; 7 = 
“extremely likely”). Next, they were asked, “If the launch of the new car took longer 
than planned, how many months do you think it would likely be delayed?”; they 
answered this question in an open response format in months. 
------------------------------ 
Insert figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
 Results and Discussion. Our rationale predicts an interaction of granularity and 
source knowledgeability on the likelihood of on-time completion, which was obtained 
(F(1,124) = 5.03, p < .05). Diagnosis of this interaction shows that the granularity 
effects observed in studies 1a and 1b replicated when the news article was based on an 
announcement of the chief research officer. In this case, participants inferred that a 
timely launch was more likely when the article referred to “104 weeks” (M = 4.0) rather 
than “2 years” (M = 3.3; t(126) = 1.74, p < .1, for the simple effect). When the 
announcement was attributed to an auto fan website, the influence of granularity was 
eliminated (Ms = 2.8 vs. 3.4 for weeks and years, respectively; t(126) = 1.42, p > .15 
for the simple effect).  
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Participants’ open-ended estimates of how many months the launch might be 
delayed followed the same pattern. When the announcement was attributed to the chief 
research officer, participants predicted a longer delay in the 2-year (M = 17.6 months) 
than in the 104-week condition (M = 9.6 months, t(126) = 2.82, p < .002, for the simple 
effect after log transformation). When the announcement was attributed to an auto fan 
website, the influence of granularity was again eliminated (Ms = 17.4 vs. 13.8, for the 
2-year and 104-week conditions, respectively; t(126) < 1, p > .4). This pattern is 
reflected in a marginally significant interaction of credibility and granularity (F(1,124) 
= 3.03, p = .08, after log transformation).  
 In sum, the previously observed granularity effect was only obtained when the 
communicator could be assumed to have the relevant knowledge. When the implied 
level of precision exceeded what the communicator was likely to know, participants’ 
judgments were not influenced by the format of the utterance, consistent with the logic 
of a Gricean conversational analysis. This contingency is not predicted by other 
conjectures about possible underlying processes, such as differential semantic 
associations with the unit used (here, week vs. year) or some nonobvious effect of the 
numerical values (here, 2 vs. 104) themselves. Note also that participants again 
predicted a shorter delay when the use of fine categories resulted in a message with 
larger numbers, provided that they could assume that the communicator is cooperative; 
this runs counter to what an emphasis on the influence of numbers per se would predict. 
Study 3 provides an extended conceptual replication of these findings.  
 
Study 3: Communicator’s Trustworthiness 
 
Study 3 manipulated the communicator’s likely cooperativeness through general 
trustworthiness information. Depending on conditions, participants learned that a 
power company has been on Forbes’ list of the “100 Most Trustworthy Companies” for 
the last 11 years or has repeatedly been found to “falsify financial records” over the last 
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11 years. In the context of a power outage, the company announced that power would 
be restored within “4 days” (coarse unit) or within “96 hours” (fine grained unit). Note 
that these announcements imply an unusually long power outage for U.S. customers 
(Apt, Lave, and Morgan 2006), whose usual experience is that power is restored faster. 
As seen in study 1, consumers bring such real-world knowledge to bear on time 
estimation tasks and more so when the message conveys low rather than high precision. 
They should therefore (i) perceive a higher likelihood that power will be restored ahead 
of time when a trustworthy company announces restoration “within 4 days” rather than 
“within 96 hours”; conversely, they should (ii) perceive a higher likelihood that power 
will be restored right on time when a trustworthy company announces restoration 
“within 96 hours” rather than “within 4 days.” In short, fine-grained units should result 
in a lower perceived likelihood of early project completion in study 3, just as they 
resulted in a lower perceived likelihood of late project completion in study 2. Finally, 
the predicted granularity effects should (iii) be attenuated or eliminated when the 
communicator is not trustworthy.  
Method. Sixty-five participants (aged 18 to 68; female 62%) were paid $10 for a 
one-hour study consisting of various unrelated tasks, in which the current study was 
embedded. The study adopted a 2 (source credibility: high vs. low) x 2 (granularity: 
high vs. low) x 2 (dependent variable: likelihood of completion ahead of time vs. 
likelihood of completion right on time) mixed design, with the first two factors 
manipulated between-subjects and the third factor within-subjects. Participants were 
told to imagine that a nearby power plant had an accident that resulted in a large power 
outage. The company promised to restore power within either “4 days” (coarse unit) or 
“96 hours” (fine grained unit). Half of the participants learned that the company “has 
been on Forbes’ list of ‘The 100 Most Trustworthy Companies’ for the last 11 years”, 
whereas the other half learned that the company “has repeatedly been found to falsify 
financial reports over the last 11 years”. After reading the scenario, participants were 
asked to estimate the likelihood that the power supply will be recovered within 3 days 
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[within 72 hours], that is, ahead of time, and the likelihood that it will be recovered on 
the 4th day [between 72 and 96 hours], that is, right on time. Both likelihood estimates 
were provided with slider bars on 60 mm scales placed in the middle of the screen. Note 
that there is no reason for the two likelihood estimates to add to 100 because it is quite 
conceivable that power will not be restored by the announced deadline.  
 
Results and Discussion. Our rationale predicts that fine grained quantity 
expressions are perceived as more precise, which implies that power restoration should 
be more likely to occur on time rather than ahead of time when the communicator uses 
a fine grained rather than coarse unit. However, this inference should be more likely 
when the speaker is considered cooperative, paralleling the perceived likelihood of 
delayed completion in study 2. The results support these predictions (figure 3). 
------------------------------ 
Insert figure 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Not surprisingly, consumers assumed that a trustworthy company is more likely to 
deliver on its promises than an untrustworthy one; hence they reported a higher 
likelihood that power is restored no later than the promised deadline (the 4th day or the 
96th hour) for the trustworthy (M = 68%) than the untrustworthy company (M = 54%; 
F(1,61) = 3.8, p = .055, for the main effect of trustworthiness). More important, the 
predicted three-way interaction of granularity, trustworthiness, and judgment (F(1,61) 
= 10.5, p < .005) was obtained and was diagnosed with separate interaction contrasts 
under trustworthy and untrustworthy company conditions. 
When a trustworthy company promised restoration “within 96 hours”, participants 
believed that there is only a 17% chance that the company would finish the job ahead 
of time (within 72 hours), but a 49% chance that it would finish the job very close to 
that time (in the 73 to 96 hours window) – presumably, the company used the precise 
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“96 hours” estimate for a reason. Participants’ estimates were more optimistic when the 
trustworthy company promised completion “within 4 days”, a less precise 
announcement that left more room for their real-world experience that power is usually 
restored faster. In this case, they believed that there is a 43% chance to have power 
restored early (within 3 days), which is significantly higher than in the fine-grained 
condition (t(31) = 2.04, p < .05); they further believed that there is a 26% chance to 
have it restored close to the communicated time (on the 4th day), which is significantly 
lower than that in fine-grained condition (t(31) = 2.93, p < .01). These differential 
effects are reflected in a significant interaction contrast of granularity and judgment 
(t(61) = 4.1, p < .001) when the communicator is trustworthy, replicating study 2. 
Further replicating study 2, the impact of granularity was eliminated when the company 
was untrustworthy (t(61) < 1, p > .6, for the interaction contrast; see figure 3 for means).  
 In combination, studies 2 and 3 highlight that the observed effects are not a function 
of “numbers” per se – they are a function of pragmatic inferences based on the choices 
made by a communicator. These inferences follow the Gricean logic of conversation 
and are only observed when recipients can assume that the communicator follows the 
maxims of cooperative conversational conduct. When this default assumption is drawn 
into question – for example, because the communicator lacks general trustworthiness 
(study 3) or lacks the relevant level of knowledge (study 2) – the otherwise observed 
granularity effects are eliminated. This contingency is not predicted by models of 
numerosity effects. 
In addition, the obtained pattern of quantitative judgments does not follow the 
predictions of numerosity models, such as anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) or 
magnitude priming (Oppenheimer et al 2008) and their variants (see Thomas and 
Morwitz 2009; Pandelaer et al. 2011). All of these models predict that “higher numbers” 
result in higher estimates, which was not the case. Whether the higher numbers 
associated with more fine grained expressions of quantities result in higher or lower 
estimates depends on substantive nature of the message and the task. In studies 2 and 
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3, participants assumed that large deviations from the announced completion time were 
less likely when a trustworthy communicator expressed the intended time of project 
completion in fine grained rather than coarse units. In study 2, this resulted in estimates 
of longer completion times when the unit was coarse (and associated with small 
numbers) rather than fine grained (and associated with large numbers); in study 3, this 
resulted in estimates of longer completion times when the unit was fine grained (and 
associated with large numbers) rather than coarse (and associated with small numbers).  
Finally, it is worth noting that fine-grained expressions of quantities can be more 
vivid and concrete than coarse expressions and can give rise to more concrete mental 
construals (Maglio and Trope 2011). From this perspective, granularity-elicited 
differences in the construal of the target may influence recipients’ judgment. Studies 2 
and 3 render this possibility unlikely. In these studies, granularity and possibly 
associated differences in vividness or concreteness were identical in the cooperative 
and uncooperative communicator conditions – yet granularity effects were only 
obtained when the communicator was cooperative.  
 
Study 4: Impact on Choice 
 
That fine grained expressions of quantity are perceived as more accurate has 
potentially important implications for product descriptions. Suppose you want to go on 
a hike that lasts about one and a half hour and you want to rely on a GPS device to find 
your way through the rough terrain. The local outfitter offers two devices that differ in 
their expected battery life and rental charge. Would the unit in which their battery life 
is expressed influence whether or not you rent the more expensive gadget to ensure a 
sufficient safety margin? Study 4 tests this possibility. We predict that consumers are 
more likely to infer that the product will deliver what it promises when the promise is 






Study 4a: Estimate. Thirty-six participants from an online subject pool received 
descriptions of two GPS devices, whose battery life was described in hours or in 
minutes. One device had a battery life of “up to 2 hours” (“up to 120 minutes”) and the 
other a battery life of “up to 3 hours” (“up to 180 minutes”). Next, participants indicated 
their best guess of the devices’ actual battery life by moving slider bars along two 60 
mm scales; the scales were labeled with “0” at the low end and with the respective “up-
to” (i.e., 2 and 3 hours or 120 and 180 minutes, respectively) at the high end.  
Study 2b: Choice. Eighty-four different participants, recruited from the same online 
subject pool, imagined renting a GPS device for a forthcoming hiking trip. The hike 
was described as a one-and-a-half hour (90-minute, respectively) trip in difficult terrain, 
“so having a GPS on during the entire trip is very important for completing the trip 
safely.” Participants were shown descriptions of two GPS devices offered for rent by a 
local outfitter. Depending on conditions, the duration of the hike and the battery life of 
both devices were expressed in minutes or in hours.  
One device had a battery life of “up to 2 hours” (“up to 120 minutes”), weighted 
300g, and was $15 to rent; the other had a battery life of “up to 3 hours” (“up to 180 
minutes”), weighted 400g, and was $25 to rent. Participants’ choice of one of these two 
GPS devices served as the dependent variable.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Estimate. Not surprisingly, participants assumed that the actual battery life of GPS 
devices falls short of their producers’ “up-to” estimates (study 4a). More importantly, 
the extent of the expected shortfall depended on the granularity used in the product 
description. Participants estimated that a battery life claim of “up to 2 hours” would 
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translate into actual service of 1.49 hours (equal to 89 minutes), whereas a claim of “up 
to 120 minutes” would translate into actual service of 106 minutes. Similarly, they 
estimated that a GPS with a battery life of “up to 3 hours” would deliver 2.40 hours 
(equal to 144 minutes) of service, whereas a GPS with a battery life of “up to 180 
minutes” would deliver 160 minutes. In sum, participants perceived the likely actual 
battery life as shorter in the “hours” than in the “minutes” condition (F(1,34) = 5.68, p 
< .05, repeated measures ANOVA).   
This pattern replicates the results of studies 1-3; consumers again inferred that the 
likely actual value is closer to the communicated value when a (trustworthy) 
communicator uses a fine grained unit. Considered in isolation, the pattern of these 
ratings is also compatible with numerosity accounts that predict that higher numbers 
per se result in higher estimates; however, those accounts are not compatible with 
studies 1-3, where messages with larger numbers resulted in smaller estimates.  
Choice. Based on the above estimates (provided by the participants in study 4a), a 
GPS device with a battery life of “up to 120 minutes” should seem a safer bet for a 90 
minute hike than a device with a battery life of “up to 2 hours”, despite the numerical 
equivalence of the claims. Empirically, this is the case (study 4b). When battery life 
was described in minutes, 57% of the participants chose the 120-minute device over the 
more expensive 180-minute device. In contrast, when battery life was described in 
hours, only 26% of the participants chose the 2-hour device over the more expensive 3-
hour device (χ²(1) = 8.28, p < .005). 
Note that this large difference in choice was observed without drawing participants’ 
attention to the granularity of the speaker’s utterance. For all participants the duration 
of the hike and the battery life of the GPS devices were expressed either in minutes or 
in hours, thus avoiding any within-participant variation in units. Moreover, participants 
who made a choice (study 4b) were not asked to provide any estimates of the devices’ 
actual battery life – those data were provided by different participants in study 4a. 
Hence, our findings indicate that consumers who read product descriptions are sensitive 
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to the units in which a product’s performance is described. Moreover, this sensitivity 
does not need external prompting beyond the desire to pick a product that serves one’s 
needs. 
Our desire to test consumers’ spontaneous sensitivity to the granularity used by a 
communicator in a choice context required that the performance estimates and the 
choice data are not provided by the same participants. Accordingly, the above between-
subjects data do not lend themselves to further within-subjects correlational analyses to 
determine mediation; instead, our argument rests on testing the logic of a causal chain 
in a series of cumulative experiments (for further methodological discussion see 




In combination, the present studies identify a granularity effect in the 
communication of quantities and illuminate its implications for consumer judgment and 
decision making. We first summarize what has been learned and then turn to alternative 
accounts.  
 
Pragmatic Inferences from Granularity 
 
According to Grice’s (1975) maxims of conversation, recipients assume that 
communicators provide information that is relevant, truthful and clear, which entails 
that their utterances are as informative as possible, but not more informative than their 
knowledge warrants. These tacit assumptions underlie the conduct of conversation in 
daily life (Grice 1975; Levinson 1983) and are at the heart of many biases and 
shortcomings in human judgment (Hilton 1995; Schwarz 1994, 1996). Drawing on 
these assumptions, consumers infer (i) that the same quantitative estimate is of higher 
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precision when it is conveyed in fine-grained (e.g., 104 weeks) rather than coarse (e.g., 
2 years) units. This (ii) influences their confidence in the estimate as reflected in the 
width of the interval that they assume to contain the true value. When asked to estimate 
the earliest and latest likely completion date of a project, for example, consumers infer 
a narrower window of time when the speaker describes the intended completion date as 
“in 52 weeks” rather than as “in one year” (study 1).  
If these effects are based on Gricean pragmatic inferences from the communicator’s 
message, they should be eliminated when the cooperativeness of the communicator is 
called into question (Grice 1975; Levinson 1983; Schwarz 1996). Consistent with this 
prediction, (iii) granularity only influenced consumers’ inferences when they could 
assume the speaker to have the knowledge required for a high level of precision (study 
2) and to be generally trustworthy (study 3), but not otherwise. Finally, consumers’ 
pragmatic inferences from the granularity of a quantitative expression influence the 
decisions they make. Specifically, consumers are (iv) more likely to believe that a 
company or product will deliver on its promises when the promise is conveyed in fine-
grained rather than coarse units (studies 1-4) and (v) choose accordingly (study 4b).   
 Not surprisingly, consumers bring additional real-world knowledge to the 
kinds of tasks presented in these studies. They know, for example, that projects are more 
likely to be delayed than to be completed early (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993; 
Kahneman, Lovallo, and Sibony 2011), and that companies have an incentive to present 
their products in a favorable light (Friestad and Wright 1994). The resulting interplay 
between real-world knowledge and pragmatic inference from granularity is apparent in 
figure 1. For example, when asked for the latest likely completion date of a project 
(study 1b), coarse granularity increases consumers’ estimates of likely delays from 52.3 
days in the “52 weeks” condition to 96.8 days in the “one year” condition; however, it 
increases their estimates for possible early completion merely from 31.8 to 42.8 days. 
Clearly, consumers not only recognize coarse granularity as a way of hedging one’s 
claims, they also know in which direction a communicator is likely to hedge. This is 
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also apparent in study 4, where consumers’ choices reflect the insight that battery 
manufacturers tend to exaggerate their product performance, especially when they 
report battery life in terms like “up to X hours”. Hence, they inferred a shorter likely 




 Psychological research has identified numerous biases in quantitative judgment, 
which received particular attention in psychophysics (for a comprehensive review see 
Poulton 1989). Some of these biases found their way into the consumer literature, 
usually through work in behavioral decision making (for a review see Thomas and 
Morwitz 2009). Much of this work focused on the influence of numbers per se. It found 
that the presentation of higher numbers –either as part of the task or as part of a more 
or less incidental context—is likely to result in higher quantitative judgments, 
consistent with the anchoring heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) that inspired 
much of the research. Our results do not challenge the process assumptions that underlie 
models of numerical estimation per se; they merely highlight that forming a judgment 
on the basis of communicated numbers involves issues that go beyond numerical 
cognition. 
From the perspective of numerical cognition, the important elements in the 
expressions “2 years” and “104 weeks” are the numbers “2” and “104”. These numbers 
are assumed to affect estimates through anchoring or a related process, much as marking 
one’s questionnaire with one’s social security number results in higher estimates on 
unrelated tasks when the social security number has a high rather than low numerical 
value (Wilson et al. 1996). But this analogy misses crucial differences. Whereas the 
social security numbers in Wilson et al.’s (1996) classic study are incidental to 
participants’ task and carry no unit of measurement, the expressions “2 years” and “104 
weeks” (i) explicitly pertain to attributes of the target of judgment and are (ii) associated 
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with differentially fine-grained units of measurement. Hence, they differ not only in 
numerical value, but also in their conversational implicatures and the inferences these 
implicatures license. As long as the communicator can be assumed to be cooperative 
(Grice 1975), the more fine-grained expression conveys higher precision, which results 
in estimates of smaller likely deviation from the communicated value (studies 1-4). 
Whether a smaller likely deviation, in turn, leads to higher or lower absolute estimates 
depends on the nature of the specific task. These conversational influences do not arise 
when the numerical values are incidental and lack a unit of measurement, as in Wilson 
et al.’s (1996) anchoring study. Tasks with such characteristics presumably capture 
numerical estimation processes in a (relatively) pure form. Unfortunately, such tasks 
are rare in real-life consumer behavior, despite their popularity in consumer research. 
For other tasks, conversational inferences may enhance as well as impair the influence 
of numerical estimation processes. For example, the numerical component of the 
expression “104 weeks” may elicit a higher numerical estimate than the numerical 
component of the expression “2 years”, but the influence of numerical estimation 
processes may be differentially constrained by the precision implied by the respective 
unit component. Future work may fruitfully develop paradigms that can identify the 
relative contributions of numerical and conversational processes. For now, the present 
studies highlight the importance of conversational inferences by documenting reversals 
that do not follow from models that focus solely on numbers: communications with 
higher numbers can result in lower estimates under conditions specified by Grice’s 
(1975) logic of conversation.  
Our conceptual analysis also suggests that some findings that have been 
confidently attributed to numerosity may have a conversational element. Recent results 
by Pandelaere and colleagues (2011) may serve as an example. Consistent with earlier 
work (e.g., Burson et al. 2009) they find, for example, that the difference between 704 
and 903 on a 1000-point scale is perceived as larger than the difference between 7 and 
9 on a 10-point scale, even though the opposite is the case (albeit by a miniscule one 
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per mille; 2/10 > 199/1000). However, participants receive more information than the 
mere numbers – they are also told that these numbers represent ratings of the likelihood 
with which two different surgical procedures are successful. From a conversational 
perspective, this information is not irrelevant to the meaning of the numbers. The 10-
point scale asks raters to differentiate at the level of deciles (where a 7 may represent a 
perceived success rate between 65% and 75%), whereas the 1000-point scale asks raters 
to differentiate at the level of 1/10 of 1 percent. As our findings show, recipients are 
sensitive to such differences in implied precision and assume that cooperative 
communicators would not use a granularity that is more precise than their knowledge 
allows. This underlies the influence of granularity on the width of confidence intervals 
(study 1). It also suggests that the confidence intervals around values of 7 or 9 are larger 
than the confidence intervals around values of 704 or 903, which would itself contribute 
to the perception that the former difference is less reliable than the latter and should 
therefore carry less weight. Hence, numerosity effects (higher numerical estimates 
when high values are presented), granularity effects based on conversational inference 
(narrower confidence intervals around the communicated value when fine-grained units 
are used) or both may contribute to the findings reported by Pandelaere and colleagues 
(2011). Moreover, their relative contribution may vary depending on the specifics of 
the task. 
In other work, Monga and Bagchi (2011) noted that people usually use large units 
to communicate large quantities and small units to communicate small quantities, a 
convention that is consistent with Gricean (1975) conversational norms. Hence, units 
come with associated expectations that can run counter to the predictions of numerosity 
models. For example, Monga and Bagchi’s (2011) participants inferred that it takes 
more resources to complete a building when its height was expressed in floors rather 
than feet, in contrast to what numerosity models would predict on the basis of the 
respective number of floors vs. number of feet. This influence of unit choice was only 
observed when the unit was more salient than the respective number, which itself can 
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be a function of task framing, construal level, and many other variables (Monga and 
Bagchi 2011).  
 As this discussion indicates, the exploration of how consumers think about 
quantities would benefit from a broader perspective that replaces the currently dominant 
focus on numbers per se with a consideration of the interplay of numbers and units in 
context. Explorations of this interplay require procedures that are sensitive to the 
situated and goal directed nature of human cognition (Smith and Semin 2004) and the 
conversational implicatures of research procedures (Bless, Strack, and Schwarz 1993; 
Schwarz 1994, 1996). A final example may illustrate this point: One account of 
numerosity effects holds that people focus on the numbers and ignore the units in which 
they are expressed (Stone et al. 2003). Testing this possibility, Pandelaere and 
colleagues (2011) drew some participants’ attention to the fact that the same quantity 
can be expressed in different units; as predicted, this eliminated the influence of large 
vs. small numbers. This is consistent with the assumption that participants did otherwise 
not attend to the unit; but it is also compatible with a more general conversational 
analysis. As a default, people assume that the format of an utterance is tailored to the 
communicator’s pragmatic intentions, which leads them to infer more precision from 
more fine-grained units (present studies) or larger quantities from larger units (as 
discussed by Monga and Bagchi 2011). Neither observation implies that people are 
unaware that expressions with different units can be numerically equivalent – they 
merely assume that a given unit is chosen for a reason. This assumption is undermined 
when they are asked to provide several magnitude ratings of the same quantity 
expressed in different units (Pandelaere et al. 2011), which conveys that units are 
exchangeable in the present context and the choice of one over another does not carry 
pragmatic information (for related findings and discussions see Igou, Bless, and 
Schwarz 2002; Schwarz 1996). Hence, the manipulation both highlights the 
equivalence of quantities and undermines the conversational implicatures of units, 
again rendering it difficult to determine the relative contributions of different processes. 
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In a similar vein, our own observation that conversational inferences can be undermined 
when the communicator is explicitly presented as unknowledgeable (study 2) or 
untrustworthy (study 3) is silent on how sensitive consumers are to such conversational 
variables in the wild, rendering it difficult to estimate the likely relative contribution of 
different processes under naturalistic conditions. In short, there is more to quantitative 
judgment than numbers or units alone and future research may fruitfully explore the 
interplay of numerical and conversational processes in context.     
  
Implications for Marketing Communication 
 
Our findings have important implications for marketing and public relations 
communication. Objectively equivalent quantities take on differential meaning when 
expressed at different levels of granularity. Accordingly, the choice of granularity needs 
attention. Consumers infer low precision from coarse granularity. Depending on 
circumstances, low precision may be perceived as a lack of knowledge or as deliberate 
hedging, with the latter suggesting that the firm may actually expect not to meet its 
promises. Neither is beneficial for the image of a firm, and objective uncertainty is 
probably better acknowledged explicitly. Note, however, that these considerations do 
not suggest that fine-grained quantity expressions are always preferable. When the level 
of granularity is finer than the communicator’s likely knowledge warrants, it 
undermines the credibility of the claim and possibly the trustworthiness of the firm. 
Future research may address the proper tuning of granularity in the communication of 
quantities, shedding light on the interplay between numeric cognition, pragmatic 




Chapter 3: The Power of Precise Numbers 
 
Suppose two sports fans tell their friends about a marathon race. One reports the 
winner’s completion time as 2h 48min, whereas the other reports it as 2h 48min 2.92sec. 
Whose friends are more likely to infer that the race was tight? Supporting your likely 
intuition, 82% of the participants in a pilot study (N = 45) believed that the second 
report is more likely to convey that the runner-up finished closely on the winner’s heels. 
Different processes may contribute to this impression. First, listeners may assume that 
the speaker’s level of precision conveys relevant information – why would a speaker 
report on split seconds if the race was won by minutes? This intuition is consistent with 
Grice’s (1975) maxims of conversation, which entail that speakers should provide all 
the information that is relevant to a task, but not more (nor less).  Second, theorizing 
in numerical cognition (Janiszewski & Uy, 2008) suggests that more precise 
expressions of quantities are represented along more fine-grained mental scales. 
Mapping a given subjective difference onto a more fine grained scale, say a scale of 
split seconds rather than minutes, gives rise to smaller estimates of objective difference, 
also resulting in the impression of a tighter race between the winner and runner-up.  
These accounts are not mutually exclusive. Mental representations of fine-grained 
numbers are indeed likely to differ from mental representations of coarse-grained 
numbers – yet no detailed representation needs to be formed when the precise number 
seems uninformative to begin with.  
 
Numerical cognition and the logic of conversation 
 In everyday life, conversational conduct is guided by tacit norms of cooperative 
communication (Grice, 1975). A maxim of relation requires speakers to provide only 
information that is relevant to the aims of the ongoing conversation; a maxim of manner 
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encourages them to do their best to be understood by recipients, which implies that 
utterances should not be more complex than needed; and a maxim of quantity asks 
speakers to provide as much information as recipients need, but neither more, nor less. 
Finally, a maxim of quality urges speakers to only say things they know to be true and 
accurate. Although violations of these maxims are common in everyday conversations, 
linguistic and behavioral research (for reviews, see Hilton, 1995; Levinson, 1983; 
Schwarz, 1994) shows that recipients interpret speakers’ utterances “on the assumption 
that they are trying to live up to these ideals” (Clark & Clark, 1977, p. 122).  
 Empirically, communicators and recipients observe these tacit norms. Compared 
to coarse expressions (e.g., one year), fine-grained expressions (e.g., 12 months) are 
more likely to be used when communicators have confidence in what they say 
(Goldsmith, Koriat, & Weinberg-Eliezer, 2002; Yaniv & Foster, 1995). Recipients, in 
turn, consider fine-grained expressions more precise and are more likely to rely on what 
they convey (Zhang & Schwarz, 2012).  When the communicator’s cooperation, 
expertise or trustworthiness are called into question, the granularity of the expression 
ceases to be informative and does not influence recipients’ judgments (Zhang & 
Schwarz, 2012). The same logic should apply to precise (vs. rounded) numbers: their 
use is only consistent with cooperative conversational conduct when the implied level 
of precision is warranted and useful for the task at hand.  
 
Implications for judgment  
 Janiszewski and Uy (2008) reported more pronounced anchoring effects when 
the anchor was presented with a high (e.g., 3.998 or 4.002) rather than low (e.g., 4) 
level of precision. Given the very small difference of 0.002 between these anchor values, 
their differential effect is difficult to derive from the two process models that account 
for the bulk of anchoring effects, namely the selective accessibility model (Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997) and the anchor-and-adjust account (Epley & Gilovich, 2001). 
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Complementing a numerical anchor-and-adjust explanation, Janiszewski and Uy (2008) 
suggested that more precise anchor values are mapped onto more fine-grained 
subjective representational scales than less precise anchor values. This difference in the 
underlying representation can result in differential anchoring effects because “X units 
of adjustment along a fine-resolution scale (…) cover less objective distance than the 
same number of units along a coarse-resolution scale” (Janiszewski & Uy, 2008, p. 121). 
From a conversational perspective, the observed advantage of precise over rounded 
numbers should be limited to conditions where the speaker is assumed to be cooperative. 
We tested this prediction in two studies, using different strategies to vary the pragmatic 
implicatures of the numbers presented to participants.  
 
Study 1 
 Participants in Study 1 (modeled after Janiszewksi & Uy, 2008, study 1) were told 
how much a retailer charges customers for a DVD player; the price was given as $29.75 
or $30, which served as the precise or rounded numeric values. To manipulate perceived 
communicative intent, the price was allegedly conveyed by the retailer or by a computer 
program that samples prices at several retailers and reports the average price.  
Previous research (Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, & Naderer, 1991) showed that messages 
from a human communicator are attributed more communicative intent than automated 
messages; hence, number precision should influence judgment under human 




In an online study, 112 U.S. participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk read a scenario modeled after Janiszewski and Uy (2008, Study 1). They were 
asked to estimate what retailers pay for a DVD drive that is currently offered to 
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consumers at the price of $29.75 (precise number) [or $30 (round number), 
respectively]. For half of the participants, these numeric values were presented as the 
current price of the DVD drive “at a major retailer”. The other half was told that the 
computer would determine the average price at three retailers of the participants’ choice. 
Next, they selected three retailers from a list of five major online retailers and the 
computer program allegedly calculated the average price of the drive at the chosen 
retailers; during this time the screen displayed the message, “Fetching price data and 
calculating.” After a few seconds, the message changed to “Based on your selection, 
the average retail price of this DVD drive in these stores is $29.75 [$30].” Finally, all 
participants provided their best estimate of the retailer cost of the DVD drive. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Analysis of variance revealed the predicted interaction of communicator and 
number precision, F(1, 107) = 4.5, p  < . 04. When the retailer provided the store’s 
retail price, participants estimated that the retailer’s cost is M = $8.2 (SD = 5.0) below 
the round retail price of $30, but only M = $4.7 (SD = 3.4) below the precise retail price 
of $29.75, F(1, 107) = 6.5 p < .02, for the simple effect; d = .82. This influence of 
number precision replicates Janiszewski and Uy (2008). It was not observed when the 
retail price was determined by a computer program, whose output is presumably void 
of communicative intent. In this case, participants estimated that the retailers’ cost is M 
= $7.6 (SD = 5.1) below the round, and M= $8.1 (SD = 5.4) below the precise retail 
price, F < 1, d = .1.  
From a conversational perspective, the number participants received conveyed 
most information when it was precise ($29.75) and provided by a cooperative human 
communicator. Consistent with this prediction, this condition differed reliably from all 
other conditions, t(109) = 2.95, p < .005, d = 1.30, which did not differ from one another, 
F < 1. 
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In sum, precise numbers elicited smaller adjustment than round numbers, but 
only when they were intentionally chosen by a human communicator rather than 
calculated by a computer program. This is consistent with earlier findings that indicate 
that human communicators are assumed to observe Gricean maxims of conversation in 




 Even in the case of human communicators, however, task characteristics can render 
the same level of detail differentially relevant. To return to our introductory example of 
a marathon race, pilot study participants inferred from numeric precision that the race 
was tight, indicating that people consider split seconds relevant to the distance between 
the winner and the runner-up, but not to the distance between the winner and the 
stragglers. If so, the precision with which the time of the winner is conveyed should 
affect performance estimates of close competitors but not of distant competitors. This 
does not imply, however, that information about the performance of the winner is 
without any informational value for the performance of much worse placed runners – 
learning, for example, that it took the winner more than 4 hours to complete the race 
might suggest that it was held under particularly difficult conditions. Hence, the 
absolute value of comparative information may influence estimation even when the 
precision of this information is deemed irrelevant. 
 To test these predictions we presented information about the shooting percentage 
of the 5th ranked player in the National Basketball Association (NBA) in a precise vs. 
rounded format and assessed its impact on estimates of the shooting percentage of the 
8th ranked vs. the 108th ranked player (Study 2a). We predicted that the precision of the 
information about the 5th ranked player (round vs. precise numbers) would affect 
estimates of the 8th ranked player, but not of the 108th ranked one. This does not entail, 
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however, that drawing the pragmatic relevance of precise numbers into question is 
sufficient to eliminate the influence of comparison values in general; it merely entails 
that precise numbers do not exert more influence than round numbers under these 
conditions.  Accordingly, Study 2b compared participants’ estimates of the shooting 
percentage of the 108th ranked player after they received information about the shooting 
percentage of the 5th ranked player in either a precise or rounded format or received no 
information. We predicted that comparison information about the 5th ranked player 
would influence estimates pertaining to the 108th ranked player, but that this influence 




 Study 2a. Participants (N = 104; mostly undergraduate students) received $10 for 
a 1h questionnaire session that included unrelated tasks from several investigators. For 
the present study, they were asked to guess the shooting percentage of an NBA player 
given the percentage of another player (adapted from Janiszewski & Uy, 2008, study 
1). Following a 2 (precise vs. round number) x 2 (high vs. low relevance) between-
participants design, they read: “NBA's 2011-2012 field goals leaders' board ranks 110 
leading players' shooting percentage in the league. LeBron James from Miami Heat 
currently ranks No. 5 on the list. His shooting percentage is 50.2% (precise) [50% 
(rounded)].” Next, participants were asked to guess the shooting percentage of Steve 
Nash, who “currently ranks No. 8 on the same list” (high relevance) or of Carmelo 
Anthony, who “currently ranks No. 108 on the same list” (low relevance). 
 The estimates of 6 participants exceeded the shooting percentage of the 5th ranked 
player, indicating that they did not understand the task; the estimates of 3 participants 
deviated by more than three standard deviations. These 9 participants were removed, 
leaving 95 participants in the analysis.  
 Study 2b.  Undergraduate students (N = 70) taking introductory marketing classes 
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participated for course credit.  As in Study 2a, some were told that the shooting 
percentage of the 5th-ranked James was either 50.2% (precise) or 50% (rounded) before 
they estimated the shooting percentage of the 108th-ranked Anthony, whereas others 
received no information about James (control).   
 
Results and discussion 
 
 Study 2a. In the high-relevance condition, the shooting percentage of the 8th-ranked 
Nash was estimated as 47.3% (SD = .02) when the performance of the 5th ranked James 
was described with a precise number, but as 41.0% (SD = .07) when it was described 
with a round number; F(1, 91) = 4.9, p = .03, d = 1.27, for the simple effect. Precision 
exerted no influence under low-relevance conditions. The shooting percentage of the 
108th-ranked Anthony was estimated as 27.9% (SD = .11) under precise and 32.0% (SD 
= .13) under round number conditions, F(1, 91) = 2.3, p > .1 , d = .34, for the simple 
effect. This pattern is reflected in the predicted interaction of number precision and 
relevance, F(1, 91) = 6.9, p = .01. In short, the influence of number precision was 
eliminated when the nature of the task rendered the pragmatic implications of precise 
numbers irrelevant. However, one might wonder whether this manipulation eliminated 
the influence of comparison information overall, rather than merely the influence of its 
precision. Study 2b addresses this issue. 
 Study 2b.  Replicating Study 2a, the precision with which information about the 
5th ranked James was conveyed did not influence participants’ estimates of the 108th 
ranked Anthony’s shooting percentage (M’s = 32.5% and 34.0%, SD = .11 and .11, 
under precise and round number conditions, respectively; t < 1, d = .14).  However, 
both of these conditions differed significantly from the no-anchor control condition, 
where Anthony’s shooting percentage was estimated to be 42% (SD = .14), t(68) = 2.9, 
p = .005, d = .71. Thus, information about the 5th ranked player influenced participants’ 
estimates of the performance of the 108th ranked player, yet the precision of that 
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information was irrelevant under these conditions. 
 
General Discussion 
 In sum, participants’ estimates were more strongly influenced by quantitative 
information that was conveyed in precise rather than round numbers, consistent with 
previous research (Janiszewski & Uy, 2008). However, an increased impact of precise 
numbers was only observed when the message came from a human communicator 
(Study 1), whose choice of quantitative expression could be assumed to reflect 
communicative intent, and pertained to a task where fine-grained distinctions were 
relevant (Study 2).  These findings extend the pragmatic analysis of the granularity of 
quantitative expressions (Zhang & Schwarz, 2012).  Our previous work showed that 
the same objective quantity is perceived as more precise and reliable, and exerts more 
influence in judgment and choice, when it is expressed in fine-grained (e.g., 120 
minutes) than in coarse (e.g.,  2 hours) units. The present findings extend this 
observation to precise vs. round numbers as indicators of precision. More important 
from a social psychological perspective, the precision of a communicator’s expression 
ceases to exert an influence when the communicator’s cooperativeness (Grice, 1975) is 
called into question, either because the communicator is not human (Study 1) or the 
level of precision is inadequate for the task (Study 2). This extends previous 
observations that precision fails to exert an influence when the communicator is seen 
either as generally untrustworthy, self-interested, or incompetent in the domain of 
judgment (Zhang & Schwarz, 2012).  
 From a broader perspective, our findings are consistent with a familiar truism: 
information that is considered relevant and diagnostic for the task at hand is more 
influential than information that is not. Nevertheless, even information that is 
recognized as irrelevant can influence judgment, e.g., by changing the accessibility of 
related information (Higgins, 1996). This tension also applies to anchoring effects in 
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quantitative judgment.  On the one hand, anchors are more influential when they seem 
relevant to the task at hand; on the other hand, this relevance is not always needed to 
obtain an anchoring effect. For example, incidental numbers are more influential 
anchors when researchers follow Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) original procedures 
by explicitly relating the anchor to the estimation task (“Is X larger or smaller than this 
number?”), which renders the anchor conversationally relevant (Wilson et al., 1996).  
On the other hand, anchoring effects of a smaller magnitude can be obtained without 
such conversational links (Wilson et al., 1996) and under conditions where the 
implausibility of the anchor is likely to undermine its conversational relevance (e.g., 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2001).  In combination, such findings illustrate that quantitative 
judgment is subject to cognitive as well as conversational processes, highlighting the 





Chapter 4: Cross-dimensional Consumer Inference 
from Quantitative Expressions 
 
In the marketplace, information about a product is rarely complete, even when the 
marketer does not intend to conceal. When making judgments and decisions, consumers 
usually need to draw on available information to make inferences about the product on 
missing attributes, such as quality and overall value (Deval et al. 2013; Gunasti and 
Ross 2009; Kardes, Posavac, and Cronley 2004; Zeithaml 1988). These inferences are 
made based on consumers’ knowledge about the product, the marketplace, and the 
marketers, following the rules of physics, economics, and communication. For example, 
product with high price is often believed to have high quality as consumers assume an 
interplay between the supply and demand forces in the market place (Broniarczyk and 
Alba 1994; Rao and Monroe 1989); similarly, consumers favor unusual color or flavor 
names as they infer that messages communicated by marketers convey useful 
information (Miller and Kahn 2005). 
In the current research, we propose and show that consumers infer product value 
through the numerical expression of product weight/volume. Product weight/volume 
expressed in a sharp (vs. round) number leads to an evaluation of higher (vs. lower) 
product value. For example, in study 1, participants estimate the price of a bottle of 
essential oil to be higher when its volume is 97ml or 103ml than when its volume is 
100ml. Different from most previous research where the cognitive representation and 
processing of numbers are considered as the main drivers of numerical judgments (see 
Dehaene [2011] and Thomas [2009] for reviews), we argue from a social perspective 
that the observed effect is a result of consumer inferences from the marketer’s choice 
of communicating the weight in a sharp (vs. round) number. Supporting this claim, the 
effect is only observed when the inference is considered relevant and applicable to the 
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target of judgment (study 2), and when the numerical expression reflects the 




Classic economic perspective would predict that very close quantities have similar 
utility and would lead to similar judgments. Previous research in pricing and numerical 
cognition, however, has demonstrated all kinds of violations. It suggests that numerical 
perception is not solely a function of the conveyed magnitude, but also determined by 
the granularity in which the quantity is expressed. A large body of research has 
demonstrated that quantities with same or very similar magnitudes can differ in terms 
of their perceived magnitudes when expressed in different granularity (Burson, Larrick, 
and Lynch 2009; Gourville 1998; Monroe 1973; Schindler and Kirby 1997; Thomas 
and Morwitz 2005). For example, $2.99 is perceived as significantly lower than $3 
(Thomas and Morwitz 2005), and the difference of 23 per thousand is perceived as 
greater than the difference of 2.3 per hundred (Burson et al. 2009).  
Another line of research investigates how the judgment of a quantity is affected by 
the granularity of a related quantity on which the focal judgment is based (Janiszewski 
and Uy 2008; Mason et al. 2013; Zhang and Schwarz 2012, 2013). It has consistently 
demonstrated that a number would be judged to be closer to a given number when the 
given number is expressed on a fine grained (vs. coarse) scale. For example, the actual 
time needed for a project is believed to be close to the estimated time when the estimate 
is made in fine vs. coarse units (e.g. 52 weeks vs. 1 year; Zhang and Schwarz 2012). 
Similarly, anchors expressed in sharp numbers leads to smaller adjustments in 
anchoring and adjustment tasks (Janiszewski and Uy 2008; Zhang and Schwarz 2013), 
and initial offers made in sharp numbers lead to closer counteroffers (Mason et al. 2013).  
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All of these lines of research are focused on how numerical expressions influence 
judgment of numerical magnitude. An interesting question to ask is whether numerical 
expressions could also have an influence beyond numerical judgment and have a cross-
dimensional impact. Previous research has demonstrated that some of the effects that 
numerical expressions may cause reflect the nature of communication: they are only 
observed in a social context where the providers of the numerical information are 
human and are considered trustworthy (Zhang and Schwarz 2012; 2013), and when the 
precision of the information is relevant to the judgment task (Zhang and Schwarz 2013). 
Extending this literature, in the current research, we study how numerical expressions 
could serve as a general cue of inference given the corresponding communicative 
context and consequently influence judgments in domains that go beyond the numbers. 
 
Numerical Processing from a Social Perspective 
 
Why are people able to draw inferences from numerical expressions? Our brain 
processes a target more fluently when the target concerns small or round numbers 
(Thomas and Morwitz 2009), presumably due to our limited capacity of short-term 
memory (Dehaene 2011, 103). Thus, using round numbers provides cognitive benefits 
for communicating, encoding, and processing numerical information. However, 
rounding also comes with cost, namely, imprecision – with rounding, the expressed 
(round) number deviates from the true value which it represents. Hence, people will 
express a quantity in a round number when its cognitive benefit outweighs the cost of 
discrepancy between the actual and the communicated number, but will present the 
actual (sharp) number when the cost is high. Consequently, the extent to which a round 
number (e.g. “100”) could possibly deviate from the actual quantity it represents is 
greater than the extent to which a close sharp number (e.g. “97”) could deviate, if at all.   
On the other side of the communication, information recipients will take into 
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consideration that the communicator chooses to use sharp/round numbers, as suggested 
by the theory of conversational logic. Conversational logic is widely observed in 
interpersonal conversation (Grice 1975; Levinson 1983; Schwarz 1994; 1996) and 
marketing communication (Miller and Kahn 2005; Xu and Wyer 2010; Zhang and 
Schwarz 2012). It suggests that a cooperative communicator should provide as much 
information as needed for the communication (maxim of relevance), but no more than 
the communicator’s knowledge could warrant (maxim of quality). It also suggests that 
recipients will interpret the communicator’s utterance, assuming that the communicator 
follows this logic as if s/he is “trying to live up to these ideals” (Clark and Clark 1977, 
122). 
In the context of numerical communication, information recipients are aware that 
the numerical expression conveys the communicator’s knowledge and intention, and 
will make judgments accordingly. Specifically, when the communicator chooses to 
present a sharp number, recipients will make two inferences: first, the communicator, 
if maybe unknown of the actual quantity which s/he communicates (e.g. when making 
estimates), is confident that the actual number would not be far away from the 
communicated (sharp) number, because otherwise the communicated number would be 
considered wrong, violating the maxim of quality; and second, the communicator, for 
a certain reason, considers the cost of rounding to be high – in other words, the 
difference between the actual number and the potential rounded number, even small, is 
relevant to the purpose of the communication and therefore cannot be ignored. Both 
inferences play important roles in judgment: when the communicator does not have 
complete information about the actual number (e.g., when making estimates), high 
granularity suggests that the communicator has more knowledge (Zhang and Schwarz 
2012); when the communicator is believed to have (near) complete information about 
the communicated number, the relevance of precision then becomes the center of the 
judgment (Zhang and Schwarz 2013).  
The current research is also focused on consumer inferences based on the relevance 
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of precision. However, different from the previous research (Mason et al. 2013; Zhang 
and Schwarz 2013), we show that recipients’ postulation of the reason for the 
communicator to choose a sharp number instead of rounding it is largely situated in the 
communicative context, which influences the domains of judgment that go beyond what 
traditional numerical judgment would predict. Specifically, we study how expressing 
product weight in sharp/round numbers influences product valuation, and explore the 
boundary conditions predicted by its underlying mechanism.    
 
Situated Inference in the Context of Product Valuation 
 
According to the maxim of relevance, sharp (vs. round) numbers are chosen by the 
communicator for a reason that is relevant to the communication. The reason, 
postulated by the recipients, forms the basis of inference. This kind of inference is 
pragmatic in nature, and is situated in the communicative context (Gauker 2001). If the 
judgment pertains to the difference between two numbers, the reason of communicating 
a sharp number may be postulated as “the difference is small” (Mason et al. 2013; 
Zhang and Scwharz 2013); however, if the judgment pertains to a different domain, the 
postulation should be constructed within that particular domain.  
In product valuation, the value of a particular SKU (e.g. a bottle of caviar) is highly 
correlated with its weight/volume: the same product containing more substance has 
higher value. Therefore, if the weight information is somewhat imprecise, the judgment 
of the value of this particular SKU would become uncertain. Such problem is 
undesirable to both marketers and consumers, and is particularly so when the unit value 
of the product is high. Therefore, when the product value is high, marketers will have 
greater motivation to describe the product weight precisely. Consequently, when the 
product weight is expressed in a sharp number instead of a round one, a reasonable 
postulation by consumers would be that the marketer could not tolerate the imprecision 
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in the product weight, which, in tasks of judging product value, would translate to the 
inference that (unit) value of the product is high. 
Therefore, the granularity in which product weight is expressed may serve as a 
source of inference about product value. Note that such judgment is based entirely on 
the analysis of the communication between marketers and consumers, which is above 
and beyond the process of numerical perception. Formally, we hypothesize that: 
H1 (The granularity effect): When the product weight is expressed in a sharp (vs. 
round) number, the product would be judged to have a high (vs. low) value.  
We propose that this effect is based on the inference that consumers draw from the 
marketer choosing to use the sharp (vs. round) number, namely, the (unit) value of the 
product is high. Predicted by the conversational logic (Grice 1975), this mechanism 
requires that the necessity for the precise communication can be reasonably grounded, 
which suggests two necessary conditions for the granularity effect. First, the product 
could be valuable so that it is reasonable for the communicator to have the need to 
communicate the product weight in precision; and second, in the given communicative 
context, there should be no accessible reason that is more plausible than “high product 
value” to explain the communicator’s choice of the sharp number. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H2a: The granularity effect will be eliminated when the inference of high value is 
unlikely to apply to the target product; and 
H2b: The granularity effect will be eliminated when the granularity can be 
explained by reasons other than the marketer’s intolerance of imprecise expressions, 
such as industry convention or government regulation. 
Finally, there is a more fundamentally necessary condition for the communicative 
intent to be inferred: the information, which serves as the basis of inference and 
judgment, must be communicated. In other words, if it is impossible for the weight 
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information to convey any communicative intent beyond its literal meaning, no 
inference could be drawn in the first place. Thus, it is further hypothesized that: 
H2c: The granularity effect will be eliminated when the weight information on 
which the value judgment is based is not directly communicated by the marketer, but is 
come up by the consumer themselves.  
In the rest of the paper, we will test H1 in study 1, and will further confirm it 
through study 2 to 4. We will also test H2a-c as moderating effects in study 2-4, 






Study 1 is a direct test of the granularity effect (H1). One hundred and fifty-three 
people recruited from an online survey panel in China participated in this study. 
Participants first read a print ad of a bottle of essential oil, together with several lines 
of product description printed in bullet points. Depending on conditions, the volume of 
this product, displayed as the last bullet point, was 97ml, 100ml, or 103ml, respectively. 
Participants were asked to estimate the market price of this product in RMB (1 RMB = 
US$ 0.15) as the dependent variable.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The result was consistent with our hypothesis: the price estimate was influenced 
53 
 
by the numerical format in which the volume was expressed. While the price estimates 
for the 97ml bottle and the 103ml bottle did not differ from each other (M = 96.0 vs. 
88.4, t(99) < 1, p > .3), they were higher than the price estimate of the 100ml bottle (M 
= 65.2, t(151) = 2.1, p < .04 for sharp vs. round). That is, expressing the weight of a 
product in a sharp (vs. round) number leads to higher value judgment. 
We propose that participants made judgment based on the inference drawing from 
the expression of 97ml/103ml: the oil was so valuable that the measure of the weight 
had to be very precise. However, one could argue that sharp numbers may be inherently 
associated with certain high-profile images because, for example, imported products, 
which are usually expensive, sometimes have sharp weight due to unit conversion; 
drawing on such association would not necessarily require an inference for the 
communicator’s intention.  
Naturally, a test of the inference process is desired. Understanding that not all 
thought processes can be correctly spelt out (Nisbett and Wilson 1977), we do not 
directly ask participants to justify their price estimates. Instead, we follow “moderation-
of-process designs” (Spencer, Zenna, and Fong 2005) and demonstrate the proposed 
mechanism by showing the key moderation effects that are only predicted by inference 




Not all inferences apply unconditionally. The inference of high value, for example, 
may apply to a bottle of essential oil, or a piece of unique handmade chocolate, but may 
not be as applicable to a piece of unique chocolate that is available in every grocery 
store. If the granularity effect is due to consumer inference, the effect should be 
eliminated when the potential inference of high value is unlikely to apply. In study 2, 
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we test this rational by varying the extent to which the marketer has the need to express 
the weight precisely for the target product. Specifically, we ask participants to estimate 
the price for either a piece of unique chocolate or a regular one. A unique chocolate is 
more likely to have high value, so its weight is deems more necessary to be presented 
precisely. In other words, the inference of high value from the sharp weight would be 
more applicable for a unique chocolate than for a regular one. Therefore, it is predicted 
that the chocolate with a sharp weight should have higher estimated price than the 




Four hundred and twelve U.S. participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and were each paid 50 cents for participation. The study adopted a 
2(product type: unique vs. regular) x 3(numerical expression: sharp-lower vs. round vs. 
sharp-higher) between-subjects design. Participants were shown a picture of a piece of 
chocolate. The information printed on the package included details about the type and 
the ingredients of the chocolate, as well as its weight (see appendix 1). The weight was 
9.7 oz. or 10 oz. or 10.3 oz. (label edited by Photoshop). Half of the participants were 
told that the chocolate was “hand-made in a family-owned factory in northwest 
Connecticut” and was “only sold in the small town where the factory is located” (the 
unique condition). The other half were told that the chocolate was “made in USA” and 
would “soon be available at all major grocery stores across the country” (the regular 
condition). As for the dependent variable, participants were asked to estimate the price 







Insert figure 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The results were consistent with our prediction (figure 1). For the unique chocolate, 
the estimated price did not differ between the two sharp weights (M = $9.4 vs. M = $9.0, 
F < 1, ns.). Combining the two sharp conditions by treating them as independent cells 
without difference (Rosenthal and Rosnow 2007), planned contrast shows that these 
two price estimates were higher than the 10 oz. chocolate (M = $7.0, F(1, 406) = 9.5, p 
< .005). However, when the chocolate was regular, the price was estimated to be $5.9, 
$5.3, and $5.2 for 9.7 oz., 10 oz., and 10.3 oz., respectively. First of all, these numbers 
were lower than the price estimates for the unique chocolates (F(1, 406) = 39.0, p 
< .001). More important, as predicted, the price estimate of the 10 oz. regular chocolate 
was not significantly different from the 9.7 oz. and the 10.3 oz. regular chocolate (F(1, 
406)< 1, p > .4). This pattern resulted in a predicted two-way interaction (F(1, 406) = 
4.0, p < .05).  
The current study shows that sharp weights lead to high price estimate for the 
unique chocolate but not for the regular one. Note that this pattern could not be 
explained by mere association between numerical form and product value or any 
explanation based on numerical perception. Moreover, it has ruled out the possibility 
that sharp numbers are more salient and hence lead to more (positive) thoughts, as the 
evidence here suggests that the effect is simply not driven by numbers per se.  
However, one could still argue that the reason for which the granularity effect did 
not occur for the regular chocolates was that participants might generally pay more 
attention to the information of a unique type of chocolate than a regular one, so the 
weight information in the unique conditions received more attention and was more 
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carefully processed. This potential concern will be addressed in the next two studies, 




Inference drawn from a piece of information is context-dependent in nature. The 
specific inference that can be drawn is usually a function of the environmental cues that 
are most accessible on the individual’s mind (Cho & Schwarz 2008; Deval et al. 2013). 
In the previous studies, the choice of using sharp numbers was attributed to the high 
product value, under which circumstance the marketer could not tolerate the possibility 
that the communicated weight deviates from its actual weight. However, if a different 
but more plausible reason is made accessible to consumers, the attribution should 
change accordingly.  
To test this prediction, we show participants the weight information of a key 
ingredient of a product. The ingredient is either presented stand-alone, or within a 
required table of ingredients, with all the ingredients expressed in a uniform numerical 
format (sharp vs. round). We predict that using sharp numbers uniformly under the 
requirement of a third party (which has no interest in communicating product value) 
would less likely to convey the marketer’s communicative intent, and therefore 




One hundred and fifty U.S. participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk and were each paid 30 cents for participation. The study adopted a 2 (listed 
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ingredients: single- vs. multiple) x 2(numerical expression: sharp vs. round) between-
subjects design. Participants were shown a print ad of a bottle of pumpkin seek oil, with 
product description displayed in bullet points. For half of the participants (single-
ingredient condition), the last bullet point indicated that the oil contained 0.95/1 gram(s) 
of cinnamoyl per serving. For the other half (multiple-ingredients condition), the 
product description did not include this particular bullet point; instead, a table of 
“Nutrition facts per serving” was shown below the product description. Participants 
were also advised that this table was a required presentation by FDA. The table 
contained four items and their weights per serving: total fat, saturated fat, sodium, and 
cinnamoyl (see appendix 2 for the stimuli). In the sharp condition, the weight of these 
four items were all presented in sharp numbers, including 0.95 grams of cinnamoyl. In 
the round condition, all the weights were presented in round numbers, including 1 gram 
of cinnamonyl. In all conditions, an asterisk was placed next to the word “cinnamoyl”, 
noting at the bottom that “Cinnamoyl is a nutritious ingredient that is beneficial to 
protect us against heart diseases.” 
 Because the different amount of total information presented in the single- vs. 
multiple-ingredients conditions could lead to different levels of attention paid to the 
focal information of cinnamoyl, all participants were first asked “To make sure you 
have read the product description above, how many grams of cinnamoyl per serving is 
contained in this product?”. The purpose of this question is to make sure that all 
participants have paid enough attention to notice our manipulation of the numerical 
expression. Next, all participants were asked to estimate the price of this bottle of 
pumpkin seed oil, which served as our DV.  
 





Insert figure 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Replicating the granularity effect, the price of the pumpkin seed oil was estimated 
to be higher when it contained 0.95 grams of cinnamoyl per serving than when it 
contained 1 gram (Msharp = $10.4 vs. Mround = $7.2, F(1, 146) = 7.4 for planned contrast 
after log transformation [and same below], p < .01). However, this was only the case in 
the single-ingredient conditions where the weight of cinnamoyl was the only weight 
presented (figure 2). When multiple ingredients and their weights were presented, the 
difference was gone (Msharp = 8.5 vs. Mround = 8.0, F(1, 146) < 1, p > .6), resulting a 
predicted two-way interaction (F(1, 146) = 4.3, p < .04).  
Same as in the previous studies, we propose that the difference of the price 
estimates in the single-ingredient conditions occurred because participants inferred that 
the cinnamoyl contained in the oil was more valuable when its weight was precise. This 
judgment of the value of cinnamoyl was reflected in the price estimate of the oil. In 
contrast, in the multiple-ingredients conditions, sharp numbers were used on the 
weights of all ingredients rather than on cinnamoyl only. Although cinnamoyl could 
still be valuable and its weight needed to be communicated in precision, the other 
ingredients were unlikely to have the same need, which rendered the inference of high 
product value unlikely. In the meantime, the “FDA requirement” provided a plausible 
explanation – it may be FDA who had a certain format requirement for the ingredient 
table. Participants might or might not adopt this particular explanation. But as long as 
the explanation they adopted was not related to product value, the different numerical 
expressions would not lead to a difference in price estimate. Consequently, the 






Communication takes place between two parties. For communicative intent to be 
inferred, there first needs to exist a communicator, a person that could have a 
communicative intent. Previous research has shown that if the information on which 
judgments are based could not possibly convey communicative intent, for instance, 
based on computer generated messages, the communication will not be attributed to 
communicative intent (Schwarz et al. 1991; Zhang and Schwarz 2013). Following the 
same logic, if the numerical information on which the judgments are based does not 
directly come from the communicator, but instead are derived by the judgment makers 
themselves, no inference would be made. In this study, we test this idea by having 
participants to calculate the product weight by themselves. If the granularity effect is 
due to consumer inference from the information conveyed by the communicator, it 
should be eliminated when the product weight directly comes from recipients 
themselves instead a communicator. After all, it does not make sense for anyone to infer 




Three hundred and thirty-five U.S. participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and were each paid 30 cents for participation. The study adopted a 2 
(calculation vs. not) x 2(sharp vs. round) between-subjects design. Participants read 
about a highly effective new weight loss drink. In the no-calculation condition, 
participants were told that the product was “sold in individual shots, while a course of 
treatment takes 10 shots with a dosage of 9.8[10]ml each shot.” (Italic added for the 
paper). After reading the product description, they were asked to estimate the price of 
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each shot of this drink, which served as our DV. In the calculation condition, 
participants were told the same information, except that the last few words were 
changed to “… with a total dosage of 98[100]ml.” In these conditions, participants were 
first asked: “Based on the description above, how much is the dosage each shot?”, and 
then asked to estimate the price of each shot.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert figure 6 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Four participants made price estimates beyond three standard deviations (after log 
transformation), and were removed, leaving 351 participants in the analysis. As shown 
in figure 3, the results in the no-calculation conditions again replicated the granularity 
effect: the price was estimated to be M = $5.1 per shot when the volume was 9.8ml/shot, 
but only M = $3.7 per shot when the volume was 10ml/shot (F(1, 327) = 12.8 for the 
planned contrast, p < .001). However, in the calculation conditions where the volume 
of each shot was calculated by the participants themselves, the volume did not make a 
difference (M = $3.9 vs. 3.9, F(1, 327) < 1, p > .9), resulting in a predicted two-way 
interaction (F(1, 327) = 3.9, p = .05). More important, our theory suggests that the 
number that participants received conveys information only when it is precise and 
conveyed by a communicator. Therefore, participants who calculated the number by 
themselves should make judgments as if they were provided round numbers which did 
not convey information. Consistent with this prediction, the sharp & no-calculation 
condition was significantly different from the other three conditions (M = $5.1 vs. $3.8, 
t(329) = 3.8, p < .001), while the other three conditions did not differ from each other 
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(F(2 , 213) < 1, p > .7). 
This study shows yet another boundary condition that is predicted by the inference 
process: when the base of judgment (i.e. weight of each shot) is come up with by the 
recipients rather than communicated from a communicator, its granularity does not 
convey extra information, and therefore does not affect judgment. The results further 
rule out the attention account which might be a confounding in study 2: the calculated 
weights were supposed to be more deeply processed than in the informed weights, yet 
still led to the elimination of the effect.  
One may wonder why the calculation turned off the granularity effect without being 
influenced by the communicative intent that the precise 10-shot dosage (98ml) may 
convey. Our explanation was that it was the dosage of one shot, rather than the dosage 
of 10 shots, that was more likely to serve as the basis of the estimate for price per shot; 






In marketing communication, numbers are used everywhere, from price to warranty, 
from shipping time to product specifications. These numbers do not only provide 
specific measurements for their own dimensions, but may also affect consumers’ 
perception on other dimensions of the product. The current research provides a first 
exploration of such cross-dimensional impact originated from numerical expressions. 
Building on Gricean logic of conversation (Grice 1975), we show that product valuation 
can be influenced by the numerical information of product weight. Specifically, product 
62 
 
weights expressed in sharp (vs. round) numbers lead to a judgment of higher product 
value. By examining three different types of moderators, we provide evidence that the 
granularity effect is driven by consumer inference. Namely, the weight is purposefully 
communicated in precision because the value of the product is high. Such effects, as far 
as we are aware of, cannot be predicted by any other mechanisms, from numerical 
perception (Janiszewski and Uy 2008) to marketplace metacognition (Wright 2002). 
Our paper has made theoretical contributions by extending (i) the literature of 
consumer inference and (ii) the literature of numerical cognition in several ways. First, 
we demonstrate that product value can be inferred not only from price, availability, 
country of origin, and product name (Deval et al., 2013; Gunasti & Ross, 2009; Kardes, 
Posavac, & Cronley, 2004; Miller & Kahn, 2005; Zeithaml, 1988), but also from the 
numerical expression of product weight, which has never been identified by consumer 
literature before.  
Second, consistent with the theory of situated inference (Gauker 2001), we 
demonstrate that the potential influence of numerical expressions goes beyond numbers, 
which is out of the reach of traditional numerical cognition and pricing research. 
Depending on the judgment task, people draw inferences about domains which the 
judgment task pertain to; depending on the specific communicative context, people 
draw inferences about the aspect of the target in which necessary information is absent. 
The inference and judgment based on a same piece of communication could virtually 
go to any domain, as long as the inference is relevant and logically reasonable. For 
example, one could expect that products with sharp weight can also be judged as having 
high quality or being more carefully processed in the proper communicative contexts.   
Third, this research provides stronger and clearer evidence that numerical judgment 
is not only a cognitive process, but is also made with social considerations. On the one 
hand, the fact that such cross-dimensional impact by numerical expressions is 
impossible to be accounted for by any models of cognitive representation of numbers. 
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On the other hand, the boundary conditions for pragmatic inferences that we explore, 
namely, the target relevance (study 2), the accessibility of other (non-pragmatic) 
inferences (study 3), and the source of information (study 4), have provided direct 




Information that leads to consumer judgment and decision making does not exist 
in a social vacuum; rather, it is communicated to consumers from manufacturers, 
advertisers, customer reviewers, and so on. In marketing communication, the 
conversational logic does not only apply, but may play an even more prominent role 
than it does in daily conversation. Presumably, this is because consumers usually do 
not get a chance to query the communicator, and hence have to rely more on pragmatic 
inferences from the message in context (Zhang and Schwarz 2012).  
In marketing practice, communicating sharp weights does not necessarily mean 
that the marketer intends to manipulate consumers’ product perception on purpose. 
However, the current research suggests that it is a possible strategy that the marketer 
could tactically adopt. More broadly, it reminds marketers about their abilities to “lie” 
about certain product attributes (e.g. value) by telling the truth about some others (e.g. 
weight). On the other hand, the conversational nature of the granularity effect suggests 
that consumers may not be able to distinguish purposefully-designed messages of this 
kind from natural logical conversations, and thus they may not be able to immune 






Gricean conversational logic plays a critical role in many communication contexts 
between communicators and recipients, including the communication between 
experimenters and participants in research settings (Schwarz 1994). Therefore, the 
effect we found in the studies could reflect participants’ inference from the 
communication delivered the experimenter rather than by the marketer. This possibility 
of misrecognizing the communicator does not invalidate the theoretical investigation of 
this paper, as the inference processes from marketer and from experimenter are 
essentially subject to the same conversational logic. Nevertheless, this possibility could 
mitigate the external validity of the findings of this research. Future research could look 




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 Traditionally, numerical perception and judgment has been studied from a 
cognitive, psychophysical, affective, or motivational perspective. However, in many 
situations, numbers that we encounter in everyday life are communicated to us by others. 
As consumers, for example, we receive numerical information from manufacturers, 
advertisers, customer reviewers. In this dissertation, I contribute to the numerical 
perception literature by studying how social considerations affect judgments made from 
numerical information. 
 
Numerical communication, first of all, always tells us about the magnitude of the 
communicated target. However, as demonstrated in this dissertation, the information 
that a piece of numerical information conveys could go beyond what it literally presents; 
the information recipients draw pragmatic inferences from its precision. As discussed 
in chapter 1, in numerical communication, a less precise expression (i.e. a round number, 
or a quantity expressed in a coarse unit) could actually be used to communicate a 
quantity that is quite different from it, while a precise expression will not. This notion 
is what all the inferences discussed throughout this dissertation are based on. In chapter 
2, the granularity of a quantitative estimate reflects how much knowledge and 
confidence the communicator has about the target; the finer the unit, the more confident 
she is that the actual outcome will not deviate far from her estimate. In chapter 3, the 
granularity of a numerical anchor implies the actual adjustment needed to arrive at the 
correct answer; a sharp anchor suggests that the adjustment should be small, and a round 
anchor suggests that the adjustment could be large. In chapter 4, I show that the 
granularity in which the weight of a product is expressed conveys how likely the actual 
weight could potentially be deviated; a sharp weight suggests that the marketer 




These granularity effects are all driven by the fact that people, including 
communicators and recipients, follow the norms of cooperative communication (Grice 
1975). In the context of quantitative communication, these norms suggest that 
communicators will use precise expressions only when they (i) are relatively certain 
about what they say, and (ii) consider precision relevant to the recipients’ judgment task. 
The former condition speaks to the quality of the communicative input made by the 
communicator, while the latter condition reflects the communicator’s motive for 
influencing the recipients’ judgment. Consistent with Grice’s (1975) theory of 
cooperative communication, the effects demonstrated in this dissertation all suggest that 
recipients understand that a cooperative communicator will only use precise 
expressions when both conditions are met, and will make inferences accordingly. 
Specifically, in chapter 2, the communicator using a fine grained unit means that she 
has confidence in the estimated event, and that she intend the recipients to know this 
fact. In contrast, the communicators in chapter 3 and 4 are assumed to have complete 
knowledge about the quantities she provide. Thus, the only inference from the 
communication is that the granularity is relevant to the communicated target. In chapter 
3, a sharp anchor suggests that a fine grained scale is relevant, and thus should be used, 
to arrive at the correct answer. In chapter 4, a sharp weight suggests that the marketer 
thinks that the tiny range of variation of the weight is required to describe the product, 
which leads to the downstream inference the product (unit) value is high.  
 
Throughout this dissertation, the mechanism of inference is proven through the 
elimination of granularity effects when the norms of communication are violated. First 
of all, for the communication to reflect the communicator’s intent, the communicator 
has to be a human. As shown in study 1 of chapter 3, when the numerical anchor is 
believed to be generated and communicated entirely by computer, the granularity effect 
disappears. Secondly, the granularity effects also disappear when the potential inference 
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from using the precise expression cannot be grounded. Specifically, when the 
communicator is unlikely to have precise knowledge about the target, using a fine 
grained unit would not lead to the inference that the communicator has knowledge and 
confidence (chapter 2, study 3). Similarly, when the difference between the target and 
the anchor cannot be small (chapter 3, study 2), or the product cannot be precious 
(chapter 4, study 2, 3), communicating sharp numbers would not lead to the inference 
that small deviation is necessary for making the right judgment. In these cases, the 
granularity effects disappear. Consistent with previous research (Dodd and Bradshaw 
1980; Schwarz 1996; Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, and Naderer 1991; Smith and Ellsworth 
1987), these moderation effects show that the application of conversational norms is 
not unconditional. The norms stop affecting recipients’ inference not only when the 
cooperativeness of the communicator is called into question, but also when the potential 
inference is unlikely to be true given the judgment context or the nature of the target.  
 
In everyday life, individuals make sense of the information they receive, including 
quantitative information. A precise quantity suggests that the (potential) deviation from 
it is small. This dissertation has demonstrated and analyzed examples of judgment 
contexts in which such inference would or would not occur. However, inferences are 
context dependent and the same numerical expression may have different or even 
opposite downstream inferences with different environmental cues, which is an avenue 
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Figure 4: Results of Study 2, Chapter 4 
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Figure 5: Results of Study 3, Chapter 4 
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Figure 6: Results of Study 4, Chapter 4 
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